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Independent Orbiter Assessment 
Assessment of the L i f e  Support and 
Airlock support System FMEA/CIL 
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in 
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List 
(CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE Projects 
Office to perform the hardware analysis using the instructions and 
ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions for PreDaration of 
FMEA and CIL. 10 October 1986. 
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and 
Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft 
failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve 
independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon 
the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The 
IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with 
proposed Post 51-L updates included. The resolution of the 
discrepancies from the comparison was not completed due to a 
contract termination. However, the discrepancies were flagged for 
potential future resolution. This report documents the results of 
that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. 
The IOA product for the LSS and ALSS analysis consisted of 511 
failure mode llworksheetsll that resulted in 140 potential critical 
items. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline dated 1 October 
1987 which consisted of 456 FMEAs and 101 CIL items. After the 
assessment process the number of IOA analysis worksheets rose to 
694 which included a total of 171 CIL items. The difference in 
the number of IOA analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEAs can be 
explained by the different levels of analysis detail performed to 
identify failure modes. The comparison was used to determine if 
there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were 
not in the NASA baseline. The IOA analysis identified 39 failure 
modes, 6 of which were classified as CIL items, for components 
not covered by the NASA FMEAs. It was recommended that these 
failure modes be added to the NASA FMEA baseline. The overall 
assessment produced agreement on all but 301 F'MEAs which caused 
differences in 111 CIL items. Figure 1 presents a comparison of 
the proposed Post 51-L NASA data, with the IOA recommended 
baseline, and any issues. 
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2 . 0  INTRODUCTION 
2.1 Purpose 
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress safety 
policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National Space 
Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has undertaken the 
task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space Shuttle design. 
MDAC is providing an independent 
reevaluation results for completeness and technical accuracy. 
The 
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL 
2.2 Scope 
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity 
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware 
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment 
Contractor Statement of Work. 
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and 
operational requirements for all mission phases. 
Each subsystem analysis addresses 
2.3 Analysis Approach 
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utilizing 
as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem into 
components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item is 
evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These data 
are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, and are 
used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime Contractor 
FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in the following 
Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the 
NASA and Prime 
report. 
Step 1.0 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
Step 2.0 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
Step 3.0 
3.1 
3.2 
Contractor FMEA/CIL which is documented in this 
Subsystem Familiarization 
Define subsystem functions 
Define subsystem components 
Define subsystem specific ground rules and 
assumptions 
Define subsystem analysis diagram 
Define subsystem 
Define major assemblies 
Develop detailed subsystem representations 
Failure events definition 
Construct matrix of failure modes 
Document IOA analysis results 
3 
2 . 3 Analysis Approach (concluded) 
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL 
4.1 Resolve differences 
4.2 Review in-house 
4.3 Document assessment issues 
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager 
2.4 LSS and ALSS Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The LSS and ALSS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are 
defined in Appendix B. 
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Design and Function 
The LSS provides for the collection and management of the supply 
water, collection of the metabolic waste, management of the waste 
water, smoke detection and fire suppression. The ALSS provides 
water, oxygen, and electrical power to support an Extravehicular 
Activity (EVA) in the airlock. Below is a brief description of 
each of these categories. 
1. Supply Water Subsystem - The SWS provides ullage for the 
storage and the management of fuel cell generated water 
throughout the mission. The water is used to meet the Flash 
Evaporator System (FES) requirements, crew usage, and EVA 
requirements. For the purpose of this study the SWS was 
divided into five main assemblies as shown in Figures 2 
through 5. 
The tank assembly is made up of four tanks (A, B, C, and D) 
and associated plumbing which interconnects them as shown in 
Figure 2. Each tank is constructed of thin-wall aluminum 
with Inconel steel bellows pressurized by the gaseous 
nitrogen from the Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure 
Control System (ARPCS). Each tank can be isolated from the 
line by an inlet valve and an outlet valve in the event of a 
leak. The fuel cells generated water flows into the tanks 
A, B, C, and D respectively after passing through two 
hydrogen separators. The flow to a given tank is 
accomplished automatically by use of two 1.5 psid relief 
valves. Before flowing into Tank A the water passes through 
a microbial filter/check valve which prevents passage of 
micro-organisms into the potable water tank. 
The galley line assembly contains the plumbing fo r  the 
transport of the potable water from Tank A to the 
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) bay 
for connection to the galley or the water dispenser as shown 
in Figure 3. 
directly (70 F) or chilled. Chilled water is accomplished 
by interfacing the potable water with the ARS water coolant 
loops through a heat exchanger called water chiller. 
The water is available at the bay either 
The FES line assembly is comprised of two separate FES feed 
water lines supplying water, as shown in Figures 4 and 5, to 
meet FES requirement . The two lines may be isolated from 
each other by a crossover valve or an isolation valve on 
Line B. All the associated hardware beyond this isolation 
valve is considered as part of the ATCS analysis, and 
therefore not covered in this report. 
The dump line assembly, shown in Figures 2 and 4, provides 
for expulsion of excess water through a dump nozzle during 
on-orbit dump operation. The line incorporates an isolation 
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valve, a dump valve, and line and nozzle heaters. Also, 
capability exists to cross-tie the supply water dump line to 
the waste water dump line in the event one dump line becomes 
inoperative. The line and nozzle heaters provide thermal 
conditioning of the dump line and nozzle to prevent ice 
formation in the area. The line heaters are 
thermostatically controlled. 
The gaseous nitrogen line assembly pressurizes the tanks 
with the nitrogen from the ARPCS storage tanks as shown in 
Figure 3. Cabin atmosphere may also be used to pressurize 
the tanks if the GN2 pressurization is lost. Most of the 
hardware in this assembly are covered in the ARPCS analysis 
except for the Tank A pressure/vent panel which is included 
in this report. 
2. Waste Management Subsystem - The WMS is made up of Waste 
Collection Subsystem (WCS), Waste Water Subsystem (WWS), and 
the Vacuum Vent Subsystem ( W S )  as shown in Figure 6. These 
subsystems are used in an integrated process for the 
collection and storage of the crewmember biowaste and the 
overboard dumping of the waste fluid and gases. The 
schematics for these subsystems are shown in Figures 7 
through 10. 
The WCS, shown in Figure 7, is an integrated multifunctional 
zero-g device used to collect and process biowaste from the 
crewmembers, gases from the wet trash stowage area, and 
waste water from the EMU/Airlock support station. The WCS 
accommodates both male and female crewpembers and is 
comprised of the commode assembly, urinal assembly, 
interconnecting plumbing, mounting framework, crew 
restraints, and instrumentation. The subsystem uses a 
system of valves to direct cabin air flow through the urinal 
and fecal collection systems to draw the biowaste into the 
collection chamber. In the case of the waste fluids, a 
centrifugal separator is used to separate the waste fluids 
from the transport air flow. The waste fluids are then 
directed into the waste water subsystem and the separated 
air passes through the muffler assembly for bacteria and 
odor removal. This air is then injected into the crew cabin 
atmosphere. The WCS incorporates two redundant 
fan/separator units with one unit being operational at a 
time. 
The WWS, shown in Figure 8, provides storage and overboard 
dump capability for urine, atmospheric condensate, EMU waste 
water, and contingency cooling water to the FES. The waste 
water storage is a single thin wall aluminum tank shell 
surrounding an Inconel steel bellows. The tank is identical 
to the supply water tanks. The bellows is pressurized with 
nitrogen gas to facilitate waste water expulsion. All 
tubing is stainless steel. Flow control into and out of the 
tank is via the inlet valve. 
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3 .  
The outlet valve is used only during GSE operation. Both 
valves are electrically operated solenoid latching type 
valves. 
The WWS provides control for the overboard dump of the waste 
water through a dump nozzle at the mid fuselage as shown in 
Figure 9. 
protected by electrical heaters and thermal insulation. The 
subsystem also contains a provision to cross-tie the waste 
dump line to the supply water dump line which make it 
possible to provide waste water to the FES or supply water 
dump nozzle under contingency cases. 
water dump line or FES line poses serious contamination 
problems. Further, a Contingency Water Container (CWC) is 
flown which provides additional ullage to the waste water 
tank. 
All plumbing exterior to the crew module is 
The use of the supply 
The W S ,  shown in Figure 10, provides voluntary and 
involuntary venting of the ECLSS gases. Voluntary use of 
the vacuum vent occurs during airlock and cabin 
depressurization, and the WCS use. During on-orbit 
operation, the W S  may also be utilized in order to regain 
automatic pressure control of the cabin atmosphere in the 
event that the cabin pressure should exceed 14.7 psia. 
Involuntary venting is available for hydrogen gas from the 
H2/H20 separators, fecal vapors from the WCS, and wet trash 
vapors from the trash stowage. 
The W S  consists of a 2.0 inch O.D., 302 stainless steel 
duct, two independent line heaters, thermostats, an 
isolation valve, a 1.93 inch O.D. nozzle, and a single 
nozzle heater. The isolation valve was analyzed under the 
ALSS in this report. The line heaters are continuously 
wrapped together for the full length of the line. Each of 
the heaters contains a single thermostat. 
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystems - These two 
subsystems are emergency subsystems within the shuttle 
Caution and Warning (CCW) system. The smoke detection uses 
electronic sensors to provide on-board annunciation of an 
impending fire pre-smoke phase. Indications are provided 
through a light matrix, siren tone, and various CRT data. 
Fire suppression is provided by fire suppressant (Halon) 
bottles to suppress the ignition source. The schematic for 
these subsystems are shown in Figures 11 through 14. 
The Smoke Detection Subsystem consists of nine smoke 
detectors. A typical detector is shown in Figure 11. Six 
detectors provide redundant sensing within Avionics Bays 1, 
2, and 3 and three detectors sense the cabin atmosphere. 
Each avionics bay has two redundant sensors (Sensors A&B). 
The cabin sensors are two sensors in the flight deck at the 
left and right return air ducts, and one sensor in the cabin 
fan plenum outlet. The cabin fan plenum sensor is 
considered to provide redundancy to the left and right 
7 
flight deck sensors. Further, a fire sensed by the left or 
right sensor will be followed by an indication on the cabin 
sensor. Another detector input is also available for certain 
types of payloads such as Spacelab modules. 
Smoke detection operation is based upon sensing of invisible 
submicron particles emitted from materials subjected to 
abnormal energy levels. The detectors measure current flow 
in a measuring chamber, and the current flow in a reference 
chamber, shown in Figure 12. Air molecules in each chamber 
are ionized by a radiation source and in the measuring 
chamber the interaction of particles with the air molecules 
reduces current flow. The difference in the level sensed 
provides an indication of the particle level present. If 
either a preset level (2000+/- 200 micro g per m3) for five 
seconds or an increase in rate build-up (22 micro g per m3 
per sec) for twenty seconds is maintained, then a continuous 
alarm signal is output until a reset signal is issued. The 
system is powered from circuit breakers on Panel 014, 015, 
and 016. The indicator light matrix is located on Panel 
LlAl in the CDRs station and CRT data is available on the 
flight deck CRTs. 
speakers in the flight and middeck and through headset 
assemblies via the Audio Terminal Units. The sensed 
concentration level analog signal which was originally sent 
to the ground for monitoring has been included in the Fault 
Detection Annunciation software to provide redundant alarm 
capability. This software generated alarm is output when 
the concentration level reaches 2000 micro g per m3. 
The siren alarm is output through 
A test circuit controlled by a switch on Panel LlAl provides 
for sensor and alarm checkout, excluding the concentration 
level analog signal. The actual sensing capability is not 
checked but the electronics which process the measuring and 
reference chamber current outputs are verified by inducing 
signals representative of the sensor trip levels. Reset of 
a test or actual sensor trip is through a switch also 
located on Panel LlA1. In this test mode, three conditions 
must be present to indicate an operable sensor namely: pump 
running, particle concentration, and the particle rate of 
change greater than the preset levels. 
The Fire Suppression Subsystem consists of three permanently 
mounted fire suppressant bottles mounted in Avionics Bay 1, 
2, and 3. A typical bottle is shown in Figure 13. These 
bottles are permanently attached within each bay and 
remotely activated from panel LlAl since access to the bay 
is difficult. Activation requires an Arm/Fire sequence from 
a switch and push-button indicator to a Pyrotechnic 
Initiator Controller (PIC) that ignites a NASA Standard 
Initiator (NSI) opening the suppressant container. A 
pressure switch on the bottle is used to indicate bottle 
discharge. The power for the system comes through circuit 
breakers on panels 014, 015, and 16. The agent discharge 
indication is part of the Push-Button indicator on Panel 
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LlA1. The PIC capacitor voltage and bottle empty 
indications are telemetered to the ground. 
the permanently mounted bottles, the crew has available 
portable bottles mounted in the crew compartment. 
portable bottle is shown in Figure 14. These are used by 
the crew to dispense suppressant to the source of ignition 
within the cabin area and behind panels through the fire 
holes. 
In addition to 
A typical 
4 .  Airlock Support System - The airlock is a modular 
cylindrical structure with two hatch openings as shown in 
Figure 15. It provides oxygen, water, and electrical 
interfaces to accommodate EVA operation. 
with pressure equalization valves on each hatch and a 
decompression system. The vacuum vent isolation valve is 
also included with the airlock analysis even though it is 
mounted at the Xo576 bulkhead. 
It is also equipped 
The interface between the airlock and an Extravehicular 
Mobility Unit (EMU) is provided by the Service and’cooling 
Umbilical (SCU) , shown in Figure 16. The SCU is composed of 
hoses and electrical wiring to supply the oxygen, water, and 
electricity to the EMU while in the airlock. The SCU also 
contains valving which allows supply and waste water flow 
through a single connection at the SCU/EMU interface. The 
SCU is bolted to the airlock, leak proved and checked prior 
to launch and is permanently attached for the duration of 
the mission. 
The oxygen interface is used by the crew while in the 
airlock and it is used to recharge the EMU oxygen tanks. 
The water in the three EMU tanks can be dumped through the 
SCU into the orbiter waste water tank and the quantity 
observed on the orbiter water tank gauge. They are then 
refilled from tank C of the supply water system. 
refilling process (approximately 15 minutes), the supply 
water system crossover valve is opened, the FES is disabled 
and tank C is isolated so the quantity of water loaded into 
the EMU can be checked by the tank C gauge. 
During the 
The airlock depressurization is controlled by a three 
position valve, the valve and system are shown in Figures 16 
and 17. The valve is connected to a 2 inch, stainless 
steel, overboard vacuum vent line. The closed position 
prevents any airflow from escaping the airlock. The second 
position, labeled 11511, opens the smallest orifice which 
allows the pressure to decrease to 5 psi at an initial rate 
reduces the airlock pressure to 0.2 psi. At this pressure 
the airlock can be opened. When not in use, the valve is 
covered with a pressure/dust cap. 
cap, it is necessary to equalize the pressure across it with 
the cap vent valve. 
of 0.09 psi/sec. The third valve position, labeled I t O f 1  I 
Prior to removing the 
9 
The airlock repressurization is controlled by two pressure 
equalization valves on the hatch to the cabin, a typical se 
is shown in Figure 17. Normal repressurization is 
accomplished by placing one valve- in the B t n ~ ~ a 1 9 t  position. 
When completed, the airlock and the cabin are pressurized to 
approximately 14 psia. The orbiter environmental control 
system will automatically c0mpensat.e for the lower pressure 
and repressurize the cabin and airlock to 14.7 psia. The 
equalization valves on the payload bay hatch may be used to 
depressurize the airlock in the event of depress valve 
failure. 
The EMU power supply/battery charger provides 17.0 volts dc 
at 5 amps at the airlock interface. The Electrical System is 
shown in Figure 18. MAIN Bus A or B must be selected with 
the bus select switch and the mode selection switch must be 
in the POWER position to supply the power to the SCU. The 
mode switch in the POWER position makes the power available 
at the SCU connector and also closes a circuit that provides 
a battery feedback voltage charger control. This circuit 
inhibits EMU power when any discontinuity is sensed in the 
SCU/EMU circuitry. The mode switch in the POWER position 
also supplies power through the SCU for the EMU microphone 
amplifiers for hard-line communication. 
The vacuum vent isolation valve is mounted at the Xo576 
bulkhead which provides capability to isolate the waste 
management vent lines and the airlock vent line. However, 
the valve has an internal bleed port to vent the hydrogen 
separator and waste collection gases when it is in the 
closed position. The valve is designed to close within 2 
seconds in the event of an excessive cabin pressure loss 
rate. This is accomplished via the cabin oxygen system 1 
and 2 flow sensor circuitry. 
on demand through a bus selection and control switches (S10 
& S11) mounted in the panel ML31C and shown in Figure 19. 
The valve can also be opened 
10 
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Figure 16 - Airlock Piping And Instrumentation Diagram 
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Figure 18 - Airlock Electrical Schematic 
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations 
The life support and airlock support items zre located at various 
places within the crew compartment, and avionics bays as shown in 
Figures 20 to 22. The FES and dump nozzles are located outside 
the payload bay past 576 bulkhead. 
The LSS and ALSS interfaces with the adjoining subsytems were 
identified, and are explained below: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
EPS - The Electrical Power Subsystem provides bus power to 
drive valves, switches, instrumentation, and heaters 
throughout the systems. Also, the EPS recharges the EMU 
batteries in the airlock at the SCU. 
ARPCS - Gaseous nitrogen from the ARPCS storage tanks are 
used to pressurize the supply/waste water tanks. It is also 
used to recharge the MMU nitrogen tanks. Cabin pressure may 
be used to maintain pressure in the water tanks in the 
event that gaseous nitrogen is not available. 
ARS - The water coolant loops from the ARS chills the 
potable water through the water chiller heat exchanger. 
They are also used to cool the EMU suites while in the 
air lock. 
ATCS - The Flash Evaporator System (FES) uses water from 
the water tanks to provide thermal cooling of the freon 
loops. 
PRSD - The Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System 
provides oxygen for recharge of the EMU bottles in the 
airlock at the SCU interface. 
EMU - The EMU interfaces with the ALSS through the SCU for 
water, oxygen, and electrical power recharges. 
CE - Crew Equipment such as galley or water dispenser is 
connected to the potable lines at the ECLSS bay in the crew 
compartment. 
3.3 Hierarchy 
Figures 23 and 24 illustrates the hierarchy of the LSS and ALSS 
hardware and the corresponding subcomponents. 
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4 . 0  ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
The IOA analysis of the LSS and ALSS hardware initially generated 
511 failure mode worksheets and identified 140 Potential Critical 
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to 
facilitate comparison, 183 additional failure mode analysis 
worksheets were generated. 
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline. 
These analysis results were compared 
The NASA FMEAs and the IOA analyses were matched where possible, 
however due to the limited information provided in the NASA FMEA 
summary data packages, no resolution of most of the criticality 
discrepancies was attempted. In some cases the deliverable #2 
IOA analysis (Ref 1.) criticality was revised to reflect the 
additional information gained in the discussions with the 
Subsystem Managers during the CCB and PRCB presentation 
development process. 
Thirty-nine failure modes were generated by the IOA analysis that 
were not covered under the NASA FMEAs. The IOA recommended the 
addition of these failure modes to the NASA FMEA baseline. It 
should be noted that several of these failure modes and the 
respective hardware may be covered under other NASA analysis 
systems. 
In the IOA analysis report the Life Support System included four 
subsystems according to hardware and function. The sub-divisions 
in the IOA analysis did not exactly match the corresponding four 
subsystems analyzed by the NASA FMEA. The vacuum vent isolation 
valve analysis for the electrical components were analyzed in the 
Airlock Support System (ALSS) for the IOA analysis, however those 
components were covered under the NASA Waste Management System 
EPD&C FMEAs. The circuit breakers which control all of the dump 
line heaters were analyzed in the NASA Supply Water EPD&C FMEAs, 
but the same Components were covered in the IOA Waste Management 
Subsystem analysis. Such discrepancies were accounted for in the 
appropriate subsystem as identified by the NASA analyses. 
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the 
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented 
in Table I. In the tabulation, the IOA column is the raw number 
of IOA assessment sheets generated for the assessment process. 
The "issues" column indicates the number of IOA failure mode 
assessments where the criticalities either did not match the NASA 
FMEA or no applicable NASA FMEA was listed. 
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Table I Summary of IOA FMEA As 
I 
189 
60 
74 
Component I NASA I IOA 
324 
81 
88 
0 LSS 
sws 
WMS 
SD/FS 
o ALSS 
TOTAL 
133 I 201 
456 694 301 
7 
12 
10 
7 
36 
iessment 
25 38 72 59 201 
32 31 163 80 324 
0 24 0 29 75 
33 4 16 27 88 
90 97 251 195 688 
Issues 
113 
88 
27 
73 
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the 
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented 
in Table 11. 
Table I1 Summary of IOA CIL Assessment 
I Component I NASA I O A  
0 LSS 
sws 
WMS 
SD/FS 
o ALSS 
12 
36 
28 
25 
41 
63 
24 
43 
TOTAL I 101 171 
Issues 
22 
33 
20 
36 
111 
Table I11 presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure 
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further 
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable 
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs. 
-11 Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities I 
I Criticality: 
0 Lss 
sws 
WMS 
SD/FS 
o ALSS 
0 
6 
12 
1 
2/1R I 2/2 I 3/1R I 3/2R I 3/3 I TOTAL I 
I 
I 
1 
36 
I 
1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
B 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items 
Criticality: 1/1 2/1R 2/2 3/1R 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL 
0 LSS 
sws 0 7 25 0 9 0 41 
WMS 6 12 32 3 10 0 63 
SD/FS 12 10 0 2 0 0 24 
o ALSS 1 7 33 2 0 0 43 
TOTAL 19 36 90 7 19 0 171 
Of the failure modes analyzed, 171 were determined to be critical 
items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items is 
presented in Table IV. 
3 
Component 
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis 
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V. 
IOA ID Number 
0 Lss 
sws 
WMS 
SD/FS 
o ALSS 
~~ 
LS-1000 Series 
LS-2000 Series 
LS-3000 Series 
LS-5000 Series 
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each 
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the 
NASA Critical Items and the corresponding IOA worksheet 
identification. Appendix E contains additional IOA analysis 
worksheets supplementing previous analysis results reported 
Reference 1. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the 
NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheets. 
are also summarized. 
IOA recommendations 
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4.1 SWS Assessment Results 
The Supply Water Subsystem (SWS) assessment was done based on the 
CCB/PRCB presentations and the two criticality summary listings 
provided informally by the subsystem manager, dated October 1, 
1987. The CCB/PRCB data included detailed information on the CIL 
items which provided for a good comparison of the analyses and 
assessment of the issues. The two criticality summary listings 
(Hardware and EPD&C items) showed only the criticality, 
redundancy screens and failure modes for each item. Without an 
understanding of the criticality rationale it was difficult to 
make an adequate assessment between the NASA FMEAs and the IOA 
analysis. In those cases that a discrepancy was noted, it was 
flagged as an issue pending discussions with the subsystem 
manager or receipt of more detailed information. However, due to 
the termination of the IOA task, adequate time was not available 
to complete the assessment process. 
One of the major discrepancies noted between the NASA FMEA 
approach and the IOA analysis was the use of multiple failure 
scenarios and its application in assigning the functional 
criticalities. The IOA approach was to determine what the 
redundancies were for the hardware item under study, and then 
assign the functional criticality consistent with NSTS-22206. 
The NASA FMEA approach seemed to define the redundancy to the 
effect after the item had failed. In this fashion, IOA believes 
that the functional criticalities become so broad that visibility 
into a particular hardware item will be lost. For example, the 
NASA FMEA 06-2-1131-2 (GSE Drain QD/Cap for internal leakage) 
relates the loss of Radiators and the Ammonia Boiler System to 
the loss of the Flash Evaporator System and assigns a 1R 
functional criticality due to the total loss of the Active 
Thermal Control System. On the other hand the IOA analysis 
considered the QD and Cap as being redundant in preventing the 
failure mode of internal leakage. If these redundancies were 
lost, the Flash Evaporator System may be deprived of water which 
Loss of the radiators and the ABS is considered unassociated with 
the functional loss of the QD and Cap in the IOA analysis. 
I was considered a mission loss condition or a 2R criticality. 
Another major discrepancy between the IOA analysis and the 
FMEA approaches was over the determination of functional 
criticality for total loss of all redundancies in conjunction 
with the failure mode under study. For example, on the fuel cell 
outlet lines, the NASA FMEA treated the functional loss to 
receive fuel cell water into the water storage area due to 
external leakage the same as the case for restricted flow of the 
line. IOA agreed with the scenario for restricted flow to result 
in Igdead-heading" of the fuel cells, thus potentially a loss of 
life or vehicle condition. However, the IOA approach for 
criticality for an external leakage was considered only a 
mission impact for the functional loss. Please refer to the 
FMEAs 06-2-1132-1 and 06-2-1132-2 and the other NASA FMEAs for 
lines and fittings for further discussion of this condition. 
NASA 
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4.1 8WS Assessment Results (concluded) 
In general the criteria that IOA used in assigning criticalities 
for the SWS were: 
1. Total loss of function to expel the fuel cell 
generated water is a potential loss of life or 
vehicle, 
2. Total loss of water for flash evaporator operations 
was a mission loss, 
3. Total loss of function to remove hydrogen from the 
supply water system was a mission loss, 
4. Total loss of function to provide water to the 
galley was a mission loss, and 
5. Continuous flow of water into the cabin/mid-body 
cavity as a result of external leakage was a mission 
loss . 
Please refer to the individual assessment sheets for the detailed 
information on each item and the failure modes. 
4.2 WM8 Assessment Results 
The Waste Management Subsystem (WMS) assessment was done based on 
the CCB/PRCB presentation packages and the two criticality 
summary packages provided informally by the subsystem manager. 
The summary packages (hardware and EPDfC items) were dated 1 
October 1987 with corrections and contained only the criticality, 
redundancy screens and failure modes for each item. In those 
cases that a discrepancy between the NASA FMEA and the IOA 
analysis did occur, a flag was set in the Appendix F listing. 
The issues were scheduled to be discussed with the appropriate 
subsystem manager, however due to contract termination there was 
not sufficient time to resolve the noted issues. 
The eighty-eight discrepancy issues were grouped into fifteen 
categories. The six major categories are discussed in the 
following text. 
1. The IOA analysis of hardware not covered by the 
NASA FMEA for the WMS. (21 issues) 
2. The condition of a potential loss of the WCS was 
viewed as a 3/2R criticality by IOA for any "off 
nominal1* condition. The condition of Itoff nominalI1 
was defined as any failure which could potentially 
require use of contingency waste collection methods 
if another failure occured. However the NASA FMEA 
listed these as non-mission essential failure 
39 
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4.2 OOMS Assessment Results (concluded) 
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
criticality. In conjunction with this 
issue, it is suggested to increase the 
on board to enable the continuation of 
discrepancy 
UCD supplies 
the mission 
in the event of an WCS failure. This will preclude 
an early termination of the mission due to loss of 
the WCS system or any of the redundancy. (15 issues) 
The disagreement in the redundancy screen settings 
was due to a lack of detailed discussion in the NASA 
FMEA summary. (6 issues) 
The IOA analysis viewed of loss of the Vacuum Vent 
Dump line by blockage or by loss of the heaters as a 
potential loss of life/vehicle condition. A 
potentially hazardous atmosphere of hydrogen and 
oxygen could occur in the vacuum vent line if it 
were blocked by debris or ice. It is recommended to 
add a redundant line/nozzle heater if the scenario 
of a blocked vacuum vent line is plausible. 
(6 issues) 
The IOA analysis team could not determine any apparent 
redundant paths for the  functional criticality. 
However these same analyses were listed as relying 
on redundant hardware paths in the NASA FMEAs. 
(6 issues) 
There was a disagreement in the hardware criticality 
for hardware with functional redundancy. IOA 
analysis viewed the hardware failure to be a non- 
misson essential criticality, however subsequent 
failures in the functional path could create major 
problems. The NASA FMEA criticality viewed the 
first hardware failure to be at least a mission 
loss, if not a life threatening condition. 
(6 issues) 
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4 . 3  SD/FS Assessment Results 
The Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression (SD/FS) subsystem 
assessment was based upon multiple data packages. The NASA SD/FS 
mechanical data was obtained from a criticality summary listing 
published 1 October 1987 in conjunction with the 2 October 1987 
CCB presentation package. The CCB package provided CIL data 
which the listing substantiated, as well as provided the FMEA 
criticalities. CCB data for EPD&C as not available for 
assessment. The NASA data used for the EPD&C assessment was 
based upon a criticality summary listing also published 1 
October 1987 in conjunction with a 19 August 1987 set of boiler 
room review comments and the pre-51L data package. Since much of 
the data did not contain the total rationale, it was difficult to 
make the assessments between the NASA data and the IOA data. As 
with the water subsystems, discrepancies were flagged as an issue 
pending discussions with the subsystem manager. Again, 
termination of the IOA task precluded completion of the 
assessment processes. 
The assessment contains thirty seven (37) matches between the IOA 
analysis data and the NASA data, eleven (11) IOA failure modes 
revised to match the associated NASA criticalities, twenty two 
(22) IOA criticalities recommended over the NASA criticalities, 
five (5) additions to the IOA failure modes to cover all NASA 
analysis modes, and six (6) IOA failure modes deleted because the 
failures are not considered credible for the particular items. 
Of the twenty two IOA recommended criticalities, ten (10) 
recommended deletions as CIL items, two (2) recommended CIL item 
additions, and ten (10) made revisions which did not effect the 
CIL count. 
The major outcome of the analysis and assessment points up the 
criticality of the Avionics Bay Fire Suppressant containers. The 
concern of these single string circuits is during the ascent and 
entry phases when the crew has no opportunity to use the portable 
extinguishers in the event the primary bottles f a i l  to discharge. 
Another consideration is the common power source for the smoke 
detectors and the reset signal. Isolation of the two should 
increase the possibilities of bypassing a reset circuit problem. 
As previously stated, the assessment results were not discussed 
with the subsystem manager and therefore the overall results are 
incomplete. 
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4 .4  ALSS Assessment Results 
The Airlock Support System (ALSS) assessment was attempted based 
on the data presented by H. Rotter at the December 1987 PRCB, and 
documented in "SSV-87-92, Airlock Support Systemvt (Ref. 5) . 
Except for the items requiring waivers, the data available for 
assessment was limited. The pre 51-L FMEAs were available and 
when necessary for completeness of assessment they were used as 
the basis for the assessment. 
Assessment of those items not found in either document was not 
made, thus they were left blank (IOA assessment numbers 5022, 
5056 through 5064, 5076, 5082 and 5083). 
The following is a discussion of the principle reason for 
assessment discrepancies between the NASA FMEA and the IOA 
analysis of the ALSS. The Airlock is not, and should not be, a 
system classified as emergency hardware. 
crew can use it for emergency EVAs, but this is part of the 
procedure that has been devised to solve an emergency in another 
system. To compound that failure, that is, failing the airlock 
along with the emergency failure, to increase the criticalities 
is like assigning criticalities to procedures devised to solve 
the original emergency. With the  same logic the  EMU suits will 
have to be declared an emergency system which is also 
unacceptable because this was not the original intent for either 
system, Airlock or EMU. As is, without the Airlock being 
classified as an emergency system, the failure of any item, 
during an emergency in the payload bay is considered a second 
failure and not acceptable per NSTS 22206, Paragraphs 2.3.2.d and 
2.3.3.f. 
It may be true that the 
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A 
AAP 
ABS 
ac 
ACA 
ADPTR 
ALSS 
ALT 
AOA 
AOS 
ARPCS 
ARS 
ASSY 
ATCS 
AT0 
AUX 
AV 
CB 
CCB 
CCH 
CDR 
CE 
CIL 
CL 
CNTL 
CNTRL 
CON 
CONCENT 
COND 
CONT 
CRIT 
CRT 
cv 
cwc 
C&W 
CWS 
dc 
DETN 
DISCH 
DMP 
ECLSS 
E1 
EMU 
ENA 
EPDC, or 
EPD&C 
EPS 
EVA 
APPENDIX A 
ACRONYMS 
Amperes 
Airlock Adapter Plate 
Ammonia Boiler Subsystem 
Alternating Current 
Annunciator Control Assembly 
Adapter 
Airlock Support System 
Alternate 
Abort Once Around 
Acquisition of Signal 
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System 
Atmospheric Revitalization System 
Assembly 
Active Thermal Control System 
Abort to Orbit 
Auxillary 
Avionics 
Circuit Breaker 
Configuration Control Board 
Commode Control Handle 
Commander 
Crew Equipment 
Critical Items List 
Close 
Control 
Control 
Conical 
Concentration 
Conditioner 
Contingency 
Criticality 
Cathode Ray Tube 
Check Valve 
Contingency Water Container 
Caution and Warning 
Caution and Warning System 
Direct Current 
Detection 
Discharge 
Dump 
Environmental Control and Life Support System 
Entry Interface 
Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
Enable 
Electrical Power Distribution and Control 
Electrical Power Subsystem 
Extravehicular Activity 
A-l 
F 
Fan/Sep 
FDA 
FES 
FLD 
FLT 
FLTR 
FMEA 
F m Q  
ACRONYMS (continued) 
Functional 
Fan/Separator 
Fault Detection Annunciation 
Flash Evaporator System 
Fluid 
Flight 
Filter 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
Frequency 
g grams 
G Gravitational Acceleration 
GEN Generator 
GFE Government Furnished Equipment 
GN2 Gaseous Nitrogen 
GO2 Gaseous Oxygen 
GSE Ground Support Equipment 
HTR Heater 
Hw Hardware 
H2 Hydrogen 
H20 Water 
INDCTR Indicator 
IOA Independent Orbiter Assessment 
ISOL Isolation 
JUNCT Junction 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
LNS Lines 
LSS Life Support System 
LT Left 
LTS Lights 
LVL Level 
MDAC McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company 
MECO Main Engine Cut-off 
MET Mission Elapsed Time 
m3 Cubic Meters 
MM Major Mode 
MMU Manned Maneuvering Unit 
MN Main 
NA Not Applicable 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NOZ Nozzle 
NSI NASA Standard Initiator 
NSTS National Space Transportation System 
N2 Nitrogen 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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ACRONYMS(continued) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
OP, or 
OPN Open 
OPS Operations Sequence 
P 
PCI 
PCS 
PIC 
PLB 
PLSS 
PNL 
PORT 
POS 
POT 
PRCB 
PRESS 
PRSD 
P/L 
PSf 
psia 
psid 
Psig 
Pressure Transducer 
Potential Critical Items 
Pressure Control System 
Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller 
Payload 
Payload Bay 
Portable Life Support Subsystem 
Panel 
Portable 
Position 
Potable 
Program Requirements Control Board 
Pressure 
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution 
Pounds per Square Inch 
Pounds per Square Inch, Absolute 
Pounds per Square Inch, Differential 
Pounds per Square Inch, Gauge 
QD Quick Disconnect 
QR Quick Release 
QTY Quantity 
REG Regulator 
REPRES Repressurization 
RESIS Resistor 
RT Right 
RTLS Return To Landing Site 
SCRN 
SCU 
SD/FS 
sec 
SENS 
SM 
SMK 
Sol 
SOP 
SPLY 
STS 
s/s 
SuPPr sw 
sws 
Screen 
Senrice and Cooling Umbilical 
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem 
second 
Sensor 
System Management 
Smoke 
Solenoid 
Secondary Oxygen Pack 
Supply 
Samples per Second 
Space Transportation System 
Suppression 
Switch 
Supply Water Subsystem 
I 
I 
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ACRONYM8 (continued) 
T Temperature Transducer 
TAL Transoceanic Abort Landing 
Temp Temperature 
Thermo Thermostat 
TK Tank 
TM Telemetry 
TYP Typical 
UCD Urine Collection Device 
VAC Volts - AC 
VLV Valve 
VVS Vacuum Vent Subsystem 
wcs Waste Collection Subsystem 
WMS Waste Management Subsystem 
WRS Waste Removal Subsystem 
WTnk Waste Tank 1 
WWS Waste Water Subsystem 
X-DCR Transducer 
XOVR Cross-over 
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APPENDIX B 
DEPINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
B.l Definitions 
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For PreDaration 
of FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, were used with the following 
amplifications and additions. 
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS: 
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition 
to OPS 9, post-flight 
- TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
- AT0 - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
CREDIBLE CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in 
anticipated operational environmental conditions. 
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in 
environmental extremes 
Excludes an 
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond 
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue 
cards 
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to 
planned end of mission 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the 
highest criticality 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality 
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis 
MAJOR MODE fMM1 - major sub-mode of software operational sequence 
( ops ) 
MC 
(PASS) 
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with 
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and 
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans, 
middeck P/L, etc.) 
- Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System 
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single 
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical) 
function 
OFF-NOMINAL CRE W PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond 
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue 
cards 
ops - software operational sequence 
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec- 
tives are equal to mission objectives 
PHASE DEFI NITIONS : 
PRELA UNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter 
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff) 
LIFTOFF MIS SION PHA SE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and 
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT) 
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and 
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8 
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode 
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown 
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear 
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing 
safing operations 
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APPENDIX B 
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
B.2 Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for 
PreDaration of F'MEA/CIL, 10 October 1986, was employed with the 
following amplifications and additions. 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4 .  
5. 
The operational flight software is an accurate 
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements 
(FSSRs) . 
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of 
this task. 
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system 
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and 
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy 
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item. 
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability 
and/or the actual monitoring by the c r e w  
is beyond the scope of this task. 
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be 
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission 
being flown. 
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of 
this task. 
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and 
assembled to the design specifications/dxawings. 
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is 
designed to detect and identify problems 
before the item is approved for use. 
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed 
performed as written, and will not include human error in 
their performance. 
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error 
are out-of-scope of this task. 
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6. All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at 
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor 
Orbiter F'MEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater 
hardware detail levels but not lesser. 
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with 
other analyses requires that both analyses 
be performed to a comparable level of 
detail 
7 .  Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually 
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not 
required. 
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry 
availability and/or the actual monitoring of 
applicable data by ground-based personnel is 
beyond the scope of this task. 
8 .  The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the 
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed. 
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in 
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case 
effects for the phase of interest. 
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a 
thorough and complete analysis. 
9. Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors 
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed 
nor FMEAs assessed. 
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior 
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection. 
10. Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected 
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed. 
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior 
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection. 
11. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and 
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure 
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics. 
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to 
ensure consistency throughout IOA project. 
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ABSUMPTIONS 
B . 3  Subsystem Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level 
of the LSS and ALSS subsystem. The analysis considered the worst 
case effects of the hardware or functional failure on the 
subsystem, mission, and crew and vehicle safety. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
The Flash Evaporator System (topper only) was 
considered an unlike but redundant operation to the 
supply water dump operation during on-orbit phase. 
RATIONALE: Past missions have adequately demonstrated 
the use of FES for dumping excess water 
without significant impact to the mission 
time1 ine . 
The fuel cells dedicated dump line was considered an 
unlike but redundant way of expelling the generated 
water. 
RATIONALE: The fuel cells dedicated line has not been 
flight tested, but the NSTS-22206 (para 
2.3.2.d) considers interfacing subsystems to 
be operating within their specified 
tolerances. 
The cross-tie capability was considered an unlike but 
redundant to the supply water dump line. 
RATIONALE: The use of cross-tie capability is 
anticipated to be under severe circumstances 
when no other method is available to expel 
the water . 
The newly added water line from the fuel cells to Tank 
B was considered in this study. 
RATIONALE: This line is an approved design change and 
will be incorporated on all vehicles. 
The airlock analysis assumed two crewman for a typical 
EVA activity. 
RATIONALE: Rule 2-24 of the JSC-12820, STS Operational 
Flight Rules. 
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6 .  The airlock analysis did not consider emergency EVA to 
close the payload bay doors. 
RATIONALE: The payload bay door failure was considered 
to constitute a second failure. 
7 .  The Apollo Fecal Bags and the Urine Collection 
Devices (UCD) are considered as unlike redundant 
hardware to the WCS. 
RATIONALE: The Apollo Fecal Bags or UCD are not employed 
unless the WMS is non-functional. There 
are adequate contingency waste collection 
supplies for every crew member for at least 
3 days usage of the UCD and enough Apollo 
Fecal Bags for the mission life. If there 
is a generic material failure present in the 
contingency waste collection supplies, a 
mission loss would be developed at that time. 
8. The Contingency Water Container (CWC) is emergency 
hardware and if failed requires a change in the mission 
schedule and loss of waste collection methods. 
RATIONALE: The CWC is not employed unless the waste 
water storage and dump subsystems are 
inoperative. 
impact. 
There is a mission schedule 
9. If either the Vacuum Vent line or nozzle heater fails, 
a mission critical failure is assumed to have occured. 
RATIONALE: If the heaters fail, there is a potential 
for line or nozzle freezing and the 
possibility of line blockage due to ice 
formation. The line blockage would cause 
H2 contamination of the supply water due to 
excessive H2 pressure. There could be a 
life or vehicle critical condition if the 
hydrogen concentration in the vacuum vent 
dump line reaches an explosive concentration. 
10. Noxious gases released into the cabin atmosphere was not 
considered a mission loss event. 
RATIONALE: There is a crew discomfort judgement and 
the effects on the crew is to be.determined 
on a real-time basis. 
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11. The siren is the primary indication of a fire with FDA 
as a redundant indication. 
RATIONALE: The annunciator requires someone at the CDR 
station to know a fire exists if the siren 
fails. Telemetry data requires AOS. 
12. The Flight Deck RT and LT sensors are parallel redundant 
to each other and the Cabin sensor is serial redundant to 
both the RT and LT sensors. The time lag in sensor trig- 
gers could be a problem. 
RATIONALE: The ECLSS ductwork where the RT, LT and 
Cabin sensors are located, is such that the 
other flight deck sensor would not be 
triggered until the airflow had proceeded 
to the middeck and back up to the flight 
deck. 
reaches the other flight deck sensor, any 
incipient fire condition could be a well 
developed fire base, thus producing a 
possible loss of life condition. 
By the time the contaminated air 
13. The Test and Reset switches were not considered as 
emergency hardware, i.e., do not need to function 
during a fire situation. 
RATIONALE: The consideration is that once used after 
lift-off, they could create situations 
where redundancy was lost and therefore 
directly affect the emergency system. 
14. Loss of fire sensor checkout capabilities was 
considered a condition for mission termination. 
RATIONALE: The fear of a loss of crew as a result of 
the safety hardware failure. 
15. The portable fire-suppression bottles were not 
considered redundant to the AV Bay bottles during 
ascent or entry. 
RATIONALE: The mission event loads preclude crew 
motion about the cabin during these mission 
phases. 
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16. A ground rule for the SD/FS analysis was that the only 
failure modes for the portable fire extinguishers were 
premature operation or inoperative. No component level 
analysis was performed. 
RATIONALE: The details of the portable fire extinguishers 
were not available at the time the analysis was 
performed, thus no component analysis was 
possible. 
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APPENDIX C 
DETAILED ASSESSMENT 
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated 
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on 
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL 
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets 
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the 
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet 
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens, 
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed 
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies 
noted as ltNvt in the compare row under the column where the 
discrepancy occurred. 
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS .................................. 
Hardware Criticalities: 
1 = L o s s  of life or vehicle 
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item 
3 = All others 
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle 
Functional Criticalities: 
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle 
if failed, could cause loss of mission 
Redundancy Screens A, B and C: 
P = Passed Screen 
F = Failed Screen 
NA = Not Applicable 
NASA Data : 
Baseline = Pre 51-L FMEA/CIL 
New = Proposed Post 51-L FMEA/CIL Changes 
CIL Item : 
X = Included in CIL 
Compare Row : 
N = Non compare for that column (deviation) 
c-1 
c. 1 
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS 
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APPWDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: E-1100 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1101-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1100 
ITEM: H2 SEPARATOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THE CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER IS LOST, AND THERE IS 
NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE FOR THIS LOSS. THE PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE 
WATER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH FES AND DUMP OPERATIONS, AND CREATE 
CREW ILLNESS. THIS MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT 
SPECIALLY FOR THE EMU/EVA MISSION - RECHARGING THE EMU WATER 
TANKS WITH THE H2/H20 MIXTURE IS HAZARDOUS AND NOT BE DONE. 
ALTERNATE WATER LINE PLUS FCP RELIEF LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO EXPEL 
WATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE WILL DEAD-HEAD 
FUEL CELLS, THUS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-3 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1100A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1100 
ITEM: H2 SEPARATOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  C P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 E l  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
E N 1  [ N l  [ N l  C N I  COMPARE [ N /N 3 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER IS LOST, AND THERE IS 
NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE FOR THIS LOSS. THE PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE 
WATER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH FES AND DUMP OPERATIONS, AND CREATE 
CREW ILLNESS. THIS MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT 
SPECIALLY FOR THE EMU/EVA MISSION - RECHARGING THE EMU WATER 
TANKS WITH THE H2/H20 MIXTURE IS HAZARDOUS AND NOT BE DONE. 
ALTERNATE WATER LINE PLUS FCP RELIEF LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO EXPEL 
WATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE WILL DEAD-HEAD 
FUEL CELLS, THUS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. 
THIS FMEA WAS CONSIDERED SAME AS 06-2-1101-1 FOR THE FAILURE MODE 
STUDIED, AND MAY THEREFOR BE COMBINED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-4 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1101 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1101-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1101 
ITEM: H2 SEPARATORS (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
[ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 J [ I  [ I  [ I  
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E 2 / 2  1 [ I  C l  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA DOES NOT SEE HOW THE FAILURE OF THIS ITEM WILL HAVE ANY 
EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF THE RADIATORS OR AMMONIA BOILER IN 
ORDER TO LOOSE TOTAL COOLING CAPABILITY. LOSS OF WATER TO 
REPLENISH THE TANKS, WILL FORCE MISSION TO BE SHORTED 
(FLIGHT RULE 9-24). SINCE ADDITIONAL WATER WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE 
FOR ON-ORBIT FES USE AND CREW REQUIREMENT. FUEL CELLS WILL NOT 
BE DEAD-HEADED SINCE THIS FAILURE WILL ALWAYS RELIEVE THE WATER 
OUT. 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1102 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1101-3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1102 
ITEM: H2 SEPARATORS (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ( ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 E N 1  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 E l  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE ( ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT: - WATER WILL FLOW 
THROUGH TO THE TANKS; - LOSS OF ONE SEPARATOR IS SIGNIFICANT. 
THE BACKU? SEPARATOR IS NOT ADEQUATE TO REMOVE ALL OF THE 
HYDROGEN (WORST CASE). THE INABILITY TO REMOVE H2 (WITH WATER 
FLOWING) WILL HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT AS EXPLAINED IN MDAC- 
1100. 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1103 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1101-4 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1103 
ITEM: H2 SEPARATORS 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE F'MEA. LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE WILL BE 
DETECTED THRU CCW, AND THE CREW WILL PERFORM NOMINAL PROCEDURE TO 
ISOLATE AND STOP THE LEAK. IF LEAK PERSISTS, THE MISSION WILL BE 
SHORTED AND RETURNED. THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FROM 
OPEN ( 5  LB/HR) TO CLOSED (4 LB/HR) WILL HAVE VERY LITTLE IMPACT. 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE EXISTS, IF ADEQUATE CONSUMABLE IS NOT 
AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE. 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1103A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1103-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1103 
ITEM: H2 SEPARATORS 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  c 1  1 1  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE WILL BE 
DETECTED THRU C&W, AND THE CREW WILL PERFORM NOMINAL PROCEDURE TO 
ISOLATE AND STOP THE LEAK. IF LEAK PERSISTS, THE MISSION WILL BE 
SHORTED AND RETURNED. THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FROM 
OPEN ( 5  LB/HR) TO CLOSED (4 LB/HR) WILL HAVE VERY LITTLE IMPACT. 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE EXISTS, IF ADEQUATE CONSUMABLE IS NOT 
AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE. TIIIS FMEA MAY BE COMBINED 
WITH THE 06-2-1101-4 FOR THE FAILURE MODE STUDIED. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1104 
06-2-1155-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1104 
MICROBIAL FILTER (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 1  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF WATER TO REPLENISH TANK A AND SUPPLY GALLEY. LOSS OF 
MICROBIAL REMOVAL CAPABILITY, HOWEVER THE WATER DISPENSERS HAVE 
BUILT-IN FILTERS, AND IODINE TABLETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE. LOSS OF 
ALL THESE DOES NOT POSE LOSS OF LIFE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-9 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1104A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1146-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1104 
ITEM: MICROBIAL FILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPAREl [ /N 3 [ : I  C l  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ : I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF WATER TO REPLENISH TANK A AND SUPPLY GALLEY. LOSS OF 
MICROBIAL REMOVAL CAPABILITY, HOWEVER THE WATER DISPENSERS HAVE 
BUILT-IN FILTERS, AND IODINE TABLETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE. LOSS OF 
ALL THESE DOES NOT POSE LOSS OF LIFE. THIS FMEA IS COVERED 
BY INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS, AND MAY BE DELETED-SEE FMEA 06-2-1146- 
1, (LS-1104) AND FMEA 06-2-1117-1 (LS-1179). 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-10 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1105 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1105 
ITEM: MICROBIAL FILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 C P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
1oa [ 2 /2 3 C I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N I  [ N I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND 
FITTINGS. 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/38 c-11 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: Ls-1106 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1106 
ITEM: MICROBIAL FILTER QUICK DISCONNECT (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  C P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ : X I  IOA [ 2 /2 3 
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND 
FITTINGS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-12 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/ 2 8 /  8 7 
LS-1107 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1107 
MICROBIAL FILTER QUICK DISCONNECT 
M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  I 1  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-13 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1108 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1106-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ( 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1108 
ITEM: TANKS INLET SOLENOID VALVES (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA ( 3 /1R 3 [ P I  C NAI [ P I  
IOA ( 3 /3 j [ I  C l  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
C I *  
C l  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C 3 /2R 1 [ P I  C NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF FUNCTION (INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANK) WILL FORCE N2 
INTO THE TANKS POSING SAME PROBLEM AS H2 IN TANKS FOR FES/DUMP 
OPS AND CREW USAGE. AT WORST, POTENTIAL MISSION LOSS. 
IOA CONSIDERED ALL INLET VALVES (4) IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-14 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1108A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1110-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1108 
ITEM: TANKS INLET SOLENOID VALVES ( 4 )  
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
[ P I  NAI [ P I  C I "  NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  C l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ "1 C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF FUNCTION (INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANK) WILL FORCE N2 
INTO THE TANKS POSING SAME PROBLEM AS H2 IN TANKS FOR FES/DUMP 
OPS AND CREW USAGE. AT WORST, POTENTIAL MISSION LOSS. 
IOA CONSIDERED ALL INLET VALVES ( 4 )  IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1109 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1106-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1109 
ITEM: TANKS INLET SOLENOID VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
I HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  C l  C I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF LOSS O F  FUNCTION IS CONSIDERED TO BE 
TOTAL LOSS OF ULLAGE TO ACCEPT THE FCP WATER AND NO FCP RELIEF 
LINE AVAILABLE TO EXPEL THE GENERATED WATER. THE FMEA-1106-1 AND 
-1106-3 ARE THE SAME AND MAY BE COMBINED. IOA CONSIDERED 
ALL INLET VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-16 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1109A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1106-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ( 3 
NEW ( X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1109 
ITEM: TANKS INLET SOLENOID VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I *  
IOA ( 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C l  [ I  [ I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C l  C l  [ I  C l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF LOSS OF FUNCTION IS CONSIDERED TO BE 
TOTAL LOSS OF ULLAGE TO ACCEPT THE FCP WATER AND NO FCP RELIEF 
LINE AVAILABLE TO EXPEL THE GENERATED WATER. THE FMEA-1106-1 AND 
-1106-3 ARE THE SAME AND MAY BE COMBINED. IOA CONSIDERED 
ALL INLET VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-17 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1109B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1106-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1109 
ITEM: TANKS INLET SOLENOID VALVE ( 4 )  
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  1 1  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
c 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF LOSS OF FUNCTION IS CONSIDERED TO BE 
TOTAL LOSS OF ULLAGE TO ACCEPT THE FCP WATER AND NO FCP RELIEF 
LINE AVAILABLE TO EXPEL THE GENERATED WATER. THE FMEA-1106-1 AND 
-1106-3 ARE THE SAME AND MAY BE COMBINED. IOA CONSIDERED 
I ALL INLET VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-18 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1110 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1110 
ITEM: TANKS INLET ISOLATION VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  C N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND 
FITTINGS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-19 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1111 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1107-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1111 
ITEM: TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4) 
I LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE FMEA 06-2-1107-2/-3 ARE THE SAME AND MAY BE COMBINED. LOSS 
OF FUNCTION (INABILTY TO ISOLATE THE TANK) WITH THIS FAILURE WILL 
HAVE PRESENCE OF N2 GAS INTO THE TANKS. AND, THE TANK CAN STILL 
BE DRAINED THRU THE NEXT TANKS. 
IOA CONSIDERED ALL VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
! 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-20 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1111A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1107-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1111 
ITEM: TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) * 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE FMEA 06-2-1107-2/-3 ARE THE SAME AND MAY BE COMBINED. LOSS 
OF FUNCTION (INABILTY TO ISOLATE THE TANK) WITH THIS FAILURE WILL 
HAVE PRESENCE OF N2 GAS INTO THE TANKS. AND, THE TANK CAN STILL 
BE DRAINED THRU THE NEXT TANKS. 
IOA CONSIDERED ALL VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-21 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1111B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1111-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1111 
ITEM: TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
I COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
I IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
1 RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: 
REMARKS : 
THE FMEA 06-2-1107-2/-3 ARE 
CIL 
ITEM 
1 1  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ P I  [ P I  
If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THE SAME AND MAY BE COMBINED. LOSS 
OF F”CT1ON (INABILTY TO ISOLATE THE TANK) WITH THIS FAILURE WILL 
HAVE PRESENCE OF N2 GAS INTO THE TANKS. AND, THE TANK CAN STILL 
BE DRAINED THRU THE NEXT TANKS. 
IOA CONSIDERED ALL VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-22 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1112 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1107-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1112 
ITEM: TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED ALL OF THE OUTLET VALVES (4) IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, WHEN LOSS OF FUNCTION IS CONSIDERED 
TOTAL LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO EXPEL WATER (TANK PLUS FCP RELIEF 
LINE). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-23 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1112A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1111-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1112 
ITEM: TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M . J .  SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  C P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONSIDERED ALL OF THE OUTLET VALVES (4) IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, WHEN LOSS OF FUNCTION IS CONSIDERED 
TOTAL LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO EXPEL WATER (TANKS PLUS FCP RELIEF 
LINE). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-24 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1112B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1112 
ITEM: TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  E 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED ALL OF THE OUTLET VALVES (4) IN ONE ANALYSIS. 
IOA AGREES WITH THE F'MEA, WHEN LOSS OF FUNCTION IS CONSIDERED 
TOTAL LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO EXPEL WATER (TANKS PLUS FCP RELIEF 
LINE) 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-25 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1113 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1113 
ITEM: TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY XEDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I "  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  c 3  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
SEE MDAC-1235. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND 
FITTINGS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1114 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2031-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1114 
ITEM: SWITCH, INLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[: I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED J?MEA-EPDI;C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
1 
I 
1 
II 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1115 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2031-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1115 
ITEM: SWITCH, INLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE ' [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1  I 1  [ I  C I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPDfC DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-1116 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6VD-2031-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1116 
ITEM: SWITCH, INLET ISOL VALVE ( 4 )  
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  C NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
C I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
/ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  C l  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED =A-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1117 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2039-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1117 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATIONf ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] I N 1  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I: I *  
C l  
[ : I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  C I  [ I  E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1117A 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6VD-2039-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1117 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
C l  [ I  [ I  C I *  NASA [ 3 / 3  ] 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 C I  E l  [ I  [ I  
C l  [ I  [ I  C l  COMPARE [ / 3 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
I / ]  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-31 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1117B 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2040-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1117 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPDCC DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1117C 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2040-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1117 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J E l  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  e 3  e 3  e 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  e 3  e 3  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1118 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2044-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1118 
ITEM: RESISTOR, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
Ls-1119 
05-6VD-2048-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1119 
DIODE, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
c-. i, 
c-35 
CIL 
ITEM 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORXSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-1120 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1106-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1120 
ITEM: SOLENOID, INLET ISOL VALVE ( 4 )  
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 
COMPARE [ /N I C N I  C N 1  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  C l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1120A 
06-2-1110-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1120 
SOLENOID, INLET ISOL VALVE ( 4 )  
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] ( 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA'CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPDCC. 
HOWEVER BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1121 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1106-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1121 
ITEM: SOLENOID, INLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPDtC. 
HOWEVER BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, IOA AGREES 
WITH THE FMEA. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1121A 
06-2-1110-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1121 
SOLENOID, INLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  C l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD6rC. 
HOWEVER BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, IOA AGREES 
WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1122 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1107-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1122 
ITEM: SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
c 1  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  ( 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-1122A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1111-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1122 
ITEM: SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE ( 4 )  
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ " 1 C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
1 I "  
[ I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1122B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1107-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1122 
ITEM: SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 C J  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[: I *  
C J  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: Ls-1123 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1107-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1123 
ITEM: SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 C P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  C l  [ I  C l  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS 
PART OF THE EPDtC. HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS 
HARDWARE ITEM, IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
c-43 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1123A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1111-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1123 
ITEM: SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  E l  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS 
PART OF THE EPD&C. HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS 
HARDWARE ITEM, IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1124 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6VD-2006-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1124 
ITEM: CB, INLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
C I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  c 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPDCC DATA (ONLY A 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-45 
CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
WAS ATTEMPTED. 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1125 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2006-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1125 
ITEM: CB, INLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M . J .  SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ( J 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  1 I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
COMPARE [ / 1 [ I  C I  1 3  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE ( ] 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-1126 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2007-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1126 
ITEM: CB, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-47 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1127 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2007-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1127 
ITEM: CB, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 E l  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C l  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
C I *  
1 1  
E l  
[ I  
ADD/DELETE) 
I * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
I 
I 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1128 
06-2-1108-4 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1128 
TANKS A, B, C AND D (4) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C P J  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  1 3  [ I  [ : I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF FUNCTION (BLADDER AND HYDROPHOBIC FILTER) TO PREVENT 
WATER TO THE CABIN, WILL BE MISSION LOSS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1129 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1108-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1129 
ITEM: TANKS A, B, C AND D (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 
E P I  
[ P I  
E P I  
E P I  
[ I *  
E l  
COMPARE [ / 3 E l  E l  [ I  
, RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1130 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1108-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1130 
ITEM: TANKS A, B, C AND D (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW ( X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF NO WATER CAN BE EXPELLED INCLUDING 
THRU FCP RELIEF LINE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-51 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1131 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1109-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1131 
ITEM: SENSOR, TANKS QUANTITY (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  1 1  I 1  C I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1132 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1124-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1132 
ITEM: FILTER, GN2-TANKS INLET ( 4 )  
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
[ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF F'UNCTIONAL LOSS (INABILITY TO EXPEL 
WATER) IS CONSIDERED INCLUDING FCP RELIEF LINE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1133 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1124-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1133 
ITEM: FILTER, GN2-TANKS INLET (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 I F 1  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
E N 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA (IOA DID NOT CONSIDER THE TANK BLADDER TO BE 
REDUNDANT TO THE FILTER), BUT FEELS THAT THE SCREEN B SHOULD BE 
"NA". THE HYDROPHOBIC CHARACTER OF THE FILTER IS IN STANDBY 
UNTIL THE BLADDER RUPTURE OCCURS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1134 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1122-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1134 
ITEM: SENSOR, PRESSURE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
1 1  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF SENSOR CAN BE COMPENSATED FOR BY QUANTITY'SENSORS IN THE 
TANK. LOSS OF WATER INSTRUMENTATION MAY BE, AT VERY WORST, 
MISSION IMPACT. SEE QUANTITY SENSORS, 06-2-1109-1 (LS-1131). 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1135 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1123-1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1135 
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  C A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS 
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER. 
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST 
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN 
REMOVAL. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH RELIEF VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE 
FMEA 06-2-1141 (LS-1135A). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-56 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1135A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1141-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1135 
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  E N 1  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
E N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS 
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER. 
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST 
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN 
REMOVAL. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH RELIEF VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE 
FMEA 06-2-1123-1 (LS-1135). 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1135B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1156-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1135 
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 E l  E l  E l  E X 1  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  E N 1  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E 2 / 2  1 E l  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS 
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER. 
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST 
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN 
REMOVAL. THE FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS ONE LINES t FITTINGS 
ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1136 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1123-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1136 
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  I N 1  E N 1  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C D I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT THAT THE FUEL CELLS WILL BE 
DEAD ENDED AFTER R. VALVE FAILURE. CHECK VALVES IN THE FCP WATER 
LINE WILL PREVENT BACK FLOW TO THE CELLS. FES OPERATION WILL BE 
MAINTAINED BY COMBINED WATER IN TANKS A AND B DRAWING 
APPROXIMATELY 80 LB/HR OF WATER. FAILURE OF THE RELIEF VALVES IN 
THE FCP LINE ARE CONSIDERED UNASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILURE OF 1.5 
PSID VALVE. NO PROBLEM IS ANTICIPATED POST MECO. FUNCTIONAL 
LOSS (NO C.V.) WILL RESULT IN FLOW OF WATER THRU THE FCP VENT 
LINE FOR 8-10 MINUTES DURING PRE-MECO. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH 
VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1141-2 (LS-1136A). 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1136A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2 -114 1-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1136 
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE TWO VALVES WERE CONSIDERED IN ONE 
ANALYSIS. SEE FMEA 06-2-1123-2 (LS-1136). 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1137 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1137 
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  [ N l  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SEE MDAC-1233. THE FMEA CONSIDERED SEVERAL ITEMS IN ONE LINES 
AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1138 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1138 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
APPLICABLE DURING PRELAUNCH/POSTLANDING ONLY. FMEA DID NOT 
CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1139 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1130-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1139 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. HOWEVER THESE FMEAs MAY BE COMBINED 
AS: 1) 06-2-1130-1 AND 06-2-1162-1 FILL LINE, 2) 06-2-1131-1 AND 
06-2-1164-1 DRAIN LINE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1139A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1131-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1139 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  E l  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE C / 1 [ I  C I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE F'MEA. HOWEVER THESE FMEAs MAY BE COMBINED 
AS: 1) 06-2-1130-1 AND 06-2-1162-1 FILL LINE, 2) 06-2-1131-1 AND 
06-2-1164-1 DRAIN LINE. 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1139B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1162-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1139 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  C I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. HOWEVER THESE FMEAs MAY BE COMBINED 
AS: 1) 06-2-1130-1 AND 06-2-1162-1 FILL LINE, 2) 06-2-1131-1 AND 
06-2-1164-1 DRAIN LINE. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-65 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1139C 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1164-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1139 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
e 1  e 1  e 1  
IOA 3 / 3  3 e 3  e 1  e 1  
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 
COMPARE [ / 1 E 3  E l  E l  
, RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I "  
1 3  
e 3  
I 1  e 3  e 3  1 1  
I * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
I ADEQUATE 3 
(ADD/DELETE) 
I / ]  
I 
INADEQUATE [: ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
AS: 1) 06-2-1130-1 AND 06-2-1162-1 FILL LINE, 2) 06-2-1131-1 AND 
06-2-1164-1 DRAIN LINE. 
HOWEVER THESE FMEAs MAY BE COMBINED 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1140 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1130-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1140 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING 
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE 
MOST SEVERE EFFECT OF THIS FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS TO LOOSE CAPABILITY 
TO REPLENISH THE SUPPLY TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. 
OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY 
PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT. THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY 
PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY HAVE IMPACT ON THE 
MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE OF THE 
RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND 
QD/CAP UNDER ANALYSIS. IOA CONSIDERED QD & 
AGREES TO STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-67 
UNASSOCIATED WITH THE 
CAP SEPARATELY, BUT 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-114OA 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1131-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1140 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ F l  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
3 /2R 1 [ F l  [ F I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING 
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE 
MOST SEVERE EFFECT OF THIS FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS TO LOOSE CAPABILITY 
TO REPLENISH THE SUPPLY TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. 
OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY 
PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT. THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY 
PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY HAVE IMPACT ON THE 
MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE OF THE 
RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH THE 
QD/CAP UNDER ANALYSIS. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT 
AGREES TO STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
NASA F'MEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1141 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1141 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M . J .  SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  C I  [ I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 3  1 3  C I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA WITHDRAWS THIS. IT IS ALREADY COVERED BY LS-1233 AND -1235. 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1142 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1130-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1142 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 C F I  I F 1  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 3  E N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 C F I  [ F l  [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING 
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE 
MOST SEVERE EFFECT OF THIS FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS TO LOOSE CAPABILITY 
TO REPLENISH THE SUPPLY TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. 
OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY 
PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT. THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY 
PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY HAVE IMPACT ON THE 
MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE OF THE 
RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH THE 
QD/CAP UNDER ANALYSIS. IOA STUDIED FILL AND DRAIN TOGETHER WITH 
QD & CAP ANALYZED SEPARATELY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1142A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1131-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1142 
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
NASA [ 3 /1R J I F 1  C F J  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING 
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE 
MOST SEVERE EFFECT OF THIS FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS TO LOOSE CAPABILITY 
TO REPLENISH THE SUPPLY TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. 
OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY 
PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT. THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY 
PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY HAVE IMPACT ON THE 
MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE OF THE 
RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH THE 
QD/CAP UNDER ANALYSIS. IOA STUDIED FILL AND DRAIN TOGETHER WITH 
QD & CAP ANALYZED SEPARATELY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-71 
ASSESSMENT 
ASSESSMENT 
NASA FMEA 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
DATE: 12/28/87 
ID: LS-1143 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1143 
CAP, GSE QD (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
APPLICABLE DURING PRELAUNCH AND POSTLANDING ONLY. FMEA DID NOT 
COVER THIS FAILURE MODE. 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-72 
I 
I 
I 
D 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
D 
D 
I 
i 
I 
I 
1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1144 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1130-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1144 
ITEM: CAP, GSE QD (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ ’ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 C F I  [ F I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING 
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE 
MOST SEVERE EFFECT OF THIS FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS TO LOOSE CAPABILITY 
TO REPLENISH THE SUPPLY TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. 
OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY 
PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT. THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY 
PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY HAVE IMPACT ON THE 
MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE OF THE 
RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH THE 
QD/CAP UNDER ANALYSIS. 
IOA COVERED QD AND CAP SEPARATELY-SEE LS-1140. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1144A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1131-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1144 
ITEM: CAP, GSE QD (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F l  E F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
C N !  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 I F 1  [ F l  [ P I  C I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING 
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE 
MOST SEVERE EFFECT OF THIS FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS TO LOOSE CAPABILITY 
TO REPLENISH THE SUPPLY TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. 
OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY 
PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT. THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY 
PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY HAVE IMPACT ON THE 
MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE OF THE 
RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH THE 
QD/CAP UNDER ANALYSIS. 
IOA COVERED QD AND CAP SEPARATELY-SEE LS 1140A. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
06-2-1158-2 
LS-1145 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1145 
TANK A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES 
ADEQUATELY 
WITH THE FMEA, IF ANOTHER WAY IS UNAVAILABLE TO 
SUPPLY CREW REQUIREMENT. 
c-7 5 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1146 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1158-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1146 
ITEM: TANK A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
DURING ASCENT (PRE-MECO), THE WATER FROM TANK A MAY BACK FLOW AND 
CHECK AGAINST THE FCP C. VALVES WITH 3Gs ACTING ON THE LINES 
(SAME SCENARIO AS 06-2-1123-2, MDAC-1136). FCP RELIEF VALVE MAY 
BE FORCED OPEN AND RELIEF THE WATER OVERBOARD. WITH 
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THIS VALVE, THE FCP WILL BE DEAD-HEADED IN 
VERY SHORT TIME. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-76 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1147 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1147 
TANK A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS-IT IS ALREADY COVERED BY LS-1145. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-77 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1148 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1158-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1148 
ITEM: TANK A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M . J .  SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF N2 PRESSURIZATION WITH THE BLADDERS EXPOSED TO THE CABIN 
PRESSURE. NO ADDITIONAL FAILURE IN THE SWS WILL NEGATE THE TANKS 
PRESSURIZATION BY THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE, UNLESS THE CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE IS LOST. THIS IS NOT REALISTIC WHEN APPLIED TO 
THE SWS. LOSS OF BLADDER WILL RESULT IN FLOW OF WATER INTO CABIN - MISSION LOSS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1149 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1157-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW ( X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1149 
ITEM: TANK A VENT VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 E l  [ I  E l  E X 1  
COMPARE [ N /N ] E N 1  E N 1  E N 1  E N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 E l  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE ( 3 
INADEQUATE ( ] 
REMARKS: 
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF N2 INTO CABIN UNLESS TANK A PRESSURE VALVE IS 
CLOSED, THUS LOSS OF PRIMARY PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. CABIN IS 
AVAILABLE AS BACK-UP. WITH THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE 
PRESSURE VALVE, THE N2 WILL CONTINUOUSLY FLOW INTO CABIN UNLESS 
THE REGULATOR INLET VALVE IS CLOSED THUS LOSS OF PRIMARY N2 
SYSTEM TO PRESSURIZE ALL TANKS. ALL WATER MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
ARE STILL AVAILABLE. WATER FLOW TO GALLEY DIMINISHED BADLY AND 
MAY IMPACT MISSION IF NOT ADEQUATE. ALSO, OPERATIONALLY FLOW 
OF N2 INTO THE CABIN WILL NEGATE AUTOMATIC 02/N2 CONTROL. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1150 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1157-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1150 
ITEM: TANK A VENT VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT TANK A TO CABIN. THIS IS DONE 
PRELAUNCH FOR ASCENT OPERATION. THE UPSTREAM VENT VALVE 
(DOWNSTREAM OF 18 PSIG REG) IS AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE FOR THE LOSS. 
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THIS VALVE, WILL PREVENT MOVEMENT OF TANKS 
BLADDER FOR FILLING AND DUMPING UNLESS THE TANKS ARE CONFIGURED 
TO CABIN PRESSURE. FLOW OF WATER FOR GALLEY WILL BE VERY SLOW, 
AND IF NOT ADEQUATE IT MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1151 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1157-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1151 
ITEM: TANK A VENT VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2  ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE E ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF N2 INTO CABIN UNLESS TANK A PRESSURE VALVE IS 
CLOSED, THUS LOSS OF PRIMARY PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. CABIN IS 
AVAILABLE AS BACK-UP. WITH THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE 
PRESSURE VALVE, THE N2 WILL CONTINUOUSLY FLOW INTO CABIN UNLESS 
THE REGULATOR INLET VALVE IS CLOSED THUS LOSS OF PRIMARY N2 
SYSTEM TO PRESSURIZE ALL TANKS. ALL WATER MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
ARE STILL AVAILABLE. WATER FLOW TO GALLEY DIMINISHED BADLY AND 
MAY IMPACT MISSION IF NOT ADEQUATE. ALSO, OPERATIONALLY FLOW 
OF N2 INTO THE CABIN WILL NEGATE AUTOMATIC 02/N2 CONTROL. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-81 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1152 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1139-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1152 
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
E l  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DRAW WATER FROM FOUR TANKS AT ONCE. 
OPERATION OF DUMP AND FES AND WATER MANAGEMENT IS STILL 
MAINTAINED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1152A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1152 
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] C I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
1 1  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DRAW WATER FROM FOUR TANKS AT ONCE. 
OPERATION OF DUMP AND FES AND WATER MANAGEMENT IS STILL 
MAINTAINED. THIS FAILURE MODE WAS ALSO COVERED BY THE FMEA 06-2- 
1139-1 (LS-1152). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-83 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1153 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1139-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1153 
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TANKS A/B FROM TANKS C/D UNDER 
A SUBSEQUENT LEAKAGE OF THE LINE (SEE ALSO 06-2-1165-2, MDAC- 
1235) RESULTING IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO CABIN. LOSS OF 
FES OPERATION (NO WATER) AND PRESENCE OF WATER IN THE CABIN 
IS MISSION LOSS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1154 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1154 
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 1 1  t l  1 1  
[ I "  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  1 1 3  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SEE MDAC-1235 FOR REMARKS. THE FMEA CONSIDERED SEVERAL ITEMS IN 
ONE LINES AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1155 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1139-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1155 
ITEM: SOLENOID, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
E I "  
[ I  
COMPARE [ /N I C N I  C N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF TEE EPD6rC. 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1156 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1139-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1156 
ITEM: SOLENOID, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD6rC. 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-87 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1157 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2027-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1157 
ITEM: SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  C I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPDX DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-88 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
i 
I 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1157A 
NASA M E A  #: 05-6VD-2027-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1157 
ITEM: SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  E P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  E l  E l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N l  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E / 1  [ I  E l  E l  E l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-89 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1158 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2 02 7-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1158 
ITEM: SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 E N 1  C N I  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  C I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1159 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2027-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1159 
ITEM: SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  [ N l  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-91 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-1160 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2037-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1160 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] E N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPDtC DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA F'MEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1160A 
05-6VD-2037-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1160 
POSITION INDICATION, XOVR VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  ( 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE F'MEA. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-93 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1161 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2048-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1161 
ITEM: DIODE, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA F'MEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1162 
05-6VD-2044-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1162 
RESISTOR, XOVR VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS C I L  
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1163 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2002-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1163 
ITEM: CB, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1164 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2002-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1164 
ITEM: CB, XOVR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
I 
I 
1 
I 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-97 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1165 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1140-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1165 
ITEM: ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  c 3  [ I  C I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF LOSS OF FUNCTION IS DUMPING 
CAPABILITY. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1165A 
06-2-1165-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1165 
ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  E l  1 1  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF LOSS 
CAPABILITY. THIS FAILURE MODE IS 
2-1140-1 (LS-1165). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-99 
OF FUNCTION IS DUMPING 
ALREADY COVERED BY THE FMEA 06- 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1166 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1140-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1166 
ITEM: ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
VALVE IS'NOMINALLY OPEN, AND NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL LIKE AND 
UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FESA, DUMP, X-TIE, FCP RELIEF) WITH THIS 
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT SINCE WATER DUMP CAN BE STILL MAINTAINED - 
A/L SUPPORT MAY BE LOST. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1167 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1167 
ITEM: ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (1) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 / 2  3 C I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
1 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SEE MDAC-1235 FOR REMARKS. THE FMEA COVERED SEVERAL ITEMS INTO 
ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-101 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-1168 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1140-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT - 
MDAC ID: 1168 
ITEM: SOLENOID, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, IOA AGREES 
WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-102 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1169 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1140-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1169 
ITEM: SOLENOID, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 C I  C I  C I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  C N I  [ N l  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  E N 1  [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
C-103 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1170 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2026-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1170 
ITEM: SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] E N' 1 [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA F'MEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1170A 
05-6VD-2026-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1170 
SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] E l  [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A 
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM 
C-105 
CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
WAS ATTEMPTED. 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1171 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2026-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1171 
ITEM: SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N J [ N l  C N I  E N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1172 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2026-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1172 
ITEM: SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  1 3  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
/ 1 1 1 1 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A 
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM 
C-107 
CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
WAS ATTEMPTED. 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1173 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6VD-2001-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1173 
ITEM: CB, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  1 1  ( 1  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED F'MEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1174 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2001-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1174 
ITEM: CB, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C / l  [ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-109 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1175 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2036-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1175 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADDJDELETE ) 
[ / I  1 1  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE : 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1175A 
05-6VD-2036-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1175 
POSITION INDICATION, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-111 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
1 1  
[ I  
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1176 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2044-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1176 
ITEM: RESISTOR, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE 
INADEQUATE 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
E l  
E l  
1 1  
D/DELETE 
[ I  
[ I  
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1177 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2048-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1177 
ITEM: DIODE, FES ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  c 
IOA [ 3 /23 3 [ I  [ I  E 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 
1 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
1 [ I  
1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. ' 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-113 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1178 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1117-2 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1178 
ITEM: SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 2 /2 ] 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  C N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r 3 /2R 1 [ P I  E N 1  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF FUNCTION (INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE LINE) WILL RESULT IN 
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER TO THE CABIN - LOSS OF MISSION. THIS 
FMEA WITH 1R FUNCTIONAL CRIT SEEMS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
06-2-1117-1 2R CRIT. IN THE FIRST FMEA, THE FUNCTION OF THE 
GALLEY IS MAINTAINED, WHEREAS THE SECOND FMEA THE GALLEY IS LOST. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-114 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1179 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1117-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1179 
ITEM: SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  1 1  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IF NO OTHER 
2/2 STANDS, 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
MEANS EXIST TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE GALLEY, THEN THE 
OTHERWISE IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. 
C-115 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1179A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1163-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1179 
ITEM: SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  I 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  1 1  [ I  C l  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IF NO OTHER MEANS EXIST TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE GALLEY, THEN THE 
2/2 STANDS, OTHERWISE IOA IS AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. THIS FMEA 
IS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS WHICH IS COVERED UNDER INDIVIDUAL 
ITEMS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-116 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1179B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1155-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1179 
ITEM: SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N J  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
IF NO OTHER MEANS EXIST TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE GALLEY, THEN THE 
2/2 STANDS, OTHERWISE IOA IS AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. THIS 
FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY THE FMEA 06-2-1163-1 (LS- 
1179). 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1180 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1163-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1180 
ITEM: SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
FMEA COVERED AS PART OF THE LINES/FITTINGS ANALYSIS'. IF NO OTHER 
MEANS EXIST TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE GALLEY, THEN THE 2/2 STANDS, 
OTHERWISE IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1181 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1117-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1181 
ITEM: SOLENOID, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R I [ P I  C N I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-119 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1182 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1117-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1182 
ITEM: SOLENOID, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] E l  E 1  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPDtC. 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, IOA AGREES 
WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1183 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2033-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1183 
ITEM: SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  c 3  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-121 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-1183A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2033-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1183 
ITEM: SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  E l  
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  C N I  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ X I  
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1184 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2033-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1184 
ITEM: SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  c NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 J 1 3  [ I  C J  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N J [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  c 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPED. 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-123 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1185 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2033-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1185 
ITEM: SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  E P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2  3 E l  1 1  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA F'MEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1186 
05-6VD-2042-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1186 
POSITION INDICATION, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  C l  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 I 1 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-125 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1186A 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6VD-2042-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1186 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REXARR3 : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
'IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1187 
05-6VD-2048-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1187 
DIODE, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 c 3  ( 1  [ 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  c 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
1 c I *  
3 [ I  
1 [ I  
1 ( 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE F'MEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-127 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1188 
NASA FMEA #:  05-6VD-2044-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1188 
ITEM: RESISTOR, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
! LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1189 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2005-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW ( X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1189 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE ( N /N ] [ N l  C N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C l  [ I  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE ( 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED =A-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-129 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1190 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2005-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1190 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, GALLEY VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
’ COMPARE [ / 3 C l  C l  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
C 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
I 
i 
I 
I 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-130 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1191 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1115-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1191 
ITEM: DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. FCP RELIEF VALVE/LINE IS ALSO 
AVAILABLE TO EXPEL WATER. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-131 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1191A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1161-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1191 
ITEM: DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 E l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. FCP RELIEF VALVE/LIME IS ALSO 
AVAILABLE TO EXPEL WATER. THIS ITEM IS ALSO COVERED BY THE FMEA 
06-2-1165-1 (LS-1191B). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-132 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1191B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1191 
ITEM: DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA. FCP RELIEF VALVE/LINE IS ALSO 
AVAILABLE TO EXPEL WATER. THIS FMEA IS SAME AS THE 06-2-1161-1 
FOR THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-133 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1192 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1115-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1192 
ITEM: DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT, EXCEPT FOR WANTING TO ISOLATE THE 
LINE DOWNSTREAM DUE TO LEAKAGE FOR EXAMPLE. LOSS OF FUNCTION 
(INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE LINE UNDER LEAKAGE) WILL RESULT IN LOSS 
OF WATER FROM TANK B 
CLOSED). PRESENCE OF WATER AND/OR AVAILABILITY OF TWO TANKS ONLY 
ARE CONSIDERED MISSION LOSS. 
(TANK A AND X-OVER VALVES ARE OPERATIONALLY 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-134 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/2 8/87 
LS-1193 
06-2-1165-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1193 
DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  C F I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE CREW MODULE OR OUTSIDE TO THE 
MIDBODY UNLESS THE LEAK IS STOPPED BY SHUTTING OFF THE TANKS A 
AND B OUTLET VALVES AND X-OVER VALVE. IN THIS CASE, THE USE OF 
A/L SUPPORT (EVA MISSION) AND TWO TANKS ARE LOST FROM THE 
WATER MANAGEMENT - MISSION IMPACT. NO REDUNDANCY EXISTS TO 
COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS. ALSO, LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE 
REDUNDANCIES (FESB, FCP RELIEF) WITH THIS FAILURE RESULTS IN 
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO CABIN - FCP OPERATING. THIS FMEA 
INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-135 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1194 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1115-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1194 
ITEM: SOLENOID, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  1 1  E l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  I N 1  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPDtC. 
HOWEmR, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1195 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1115-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1195 
ITEM: SOLENOID, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE ( 3 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, IOA AGREES 
WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1196 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2030-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1196 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-138 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1196A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2030-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1196 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 1 1  I N 1  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 / 1' [ I  1 1  [ I  C l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPDCC DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-139 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1197 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6VD-2030-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1197 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUB~YSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
05-6VD-2030-1 
Ls-1198 
LIFE SUPPORT 
SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
1198 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 C P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
f. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-141 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1199 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2041-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1199 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATIONl DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  C I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  C I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1199A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2041-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1199 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH 
1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-143 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1200 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2048-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1200 
ITEM: DIODE, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA 3 / 3  
IOA 3 / 3  
COMPARE / 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
E /  
1 E 
3 E 
1 [ 
1 E 
1 E 
1 1 
1 E l  
1 E l  
[ I *  
[ I  
1 [ I  [ I  
(If dAfferent irom NASA) 
I E l  E l  E l  E l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE ] 
INADEQUATE ] 
REMAFmS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1201 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2044-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1201 
ITEM: RESISTOR, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 E l  [ I  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
1 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1202 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2008-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1202 
ITEM: CB, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSXENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 1 [ I  [ I  E l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  [ I  [ I  E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-146 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1203 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2008-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1203 
ITEM: CB, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-147 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1204 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1133-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1204 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
~ NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1204A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1161-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1204 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I / '  1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THIS FMEA INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO 
ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-149 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1205 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1133-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1205 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M . J .  SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I: 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE IS MISSION 
LOSS SINCE THE DUMP CAPABILITY CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED. 
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE DUMP ISOL VALVE WILL FORCE ISOLATING 
TANKS A& B, THEREBY LOSS OF A/L SUPPORT, FES A, X-TIE, AND 
PRIMARY DUMP LINE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-150 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1206 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1161-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1206 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FES, FCP LINE) WITH THIS 
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE CABIN. 
THIS FMEA INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND 
FITTINGS. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-151 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1207 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1133-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1207 
ITEM: SOLENOID, DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  C P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD&C. 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, IOA AGREES 
WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-152 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1208 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1133-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1208 
ITEM: SOLENOID, DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I 1  c 3  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA CONSIDERED THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS PART OF THE EPD6rC. 
H0WEVER;BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS HARDWARE ITEM, THE ABOVE 
RECOMMENDATION IS MADE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1209 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2028-1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1209 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ : I  E N 1  C 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
C l  
E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPDCC DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
~ 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1210 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2028-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1210 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL 
FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A 
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM 
CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-155 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1211 
NASA F'MEA #: 0 5 -6VD-2 0 2 8 -2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1211 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CIL 
ITEM 
CRITICALITY REDUEDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N J [ I  C N J  [ I  
I 
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I *  
c 3  
C J  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-156 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
8 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1212 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2029-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1212 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) - -  
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
FMEA-EPDtC DATA (ONLY A 
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM 
C-157 
CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
WAS ATTEMPTED. 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1213 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2029-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1213 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  E N 3  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
C l  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA - EPDtC DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-158 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1214 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2029-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1214 
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  E l  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 E l  [ I  [ I  E l  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  1 1  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-159 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1215 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2004-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1215 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 1 1  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
I 
I ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-160 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/2 8/87 
LS-1216 
05-6VD-2004-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1216 
CIRCUIT BREAKER, DUMP VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  C l  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  E l  C l  C l  
COMPARE [ / ] C l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  C l  C I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
C-161 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1217 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2038-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1217 
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDLWDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 3  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED F'MEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/2 8/87 
LS-1217A 
05-6VD-2038-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1217 
POSITION INDICATION, DUMP VALVE (1) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 E l  [ I  [ I  
1 1  [ I  C I  IOA [ 3 /3 3 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1218 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2044-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 12 18 
ITEM: RESISTOR, DUMP VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  c 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  C l  c 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C I  c 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ -  1 * 
[ I  
C I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1219 
NASA FMEA #: 0 5 -6VD-2 04 8 - 1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1219 
ITEM: DIODE, DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  J [ I  [ I  I 3  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 J I 1  [ I  [ I  C J  
COMPARE [ / 3 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  1 3  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
C / J  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-165 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1220 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1118-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE 1 ] 
NEW 1 X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1220 
ITEM: SENSOR, NOZZLE TEMPERATURE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 3  E N 3  E N 3  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
1 1  
E 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 3  1 3  1 3  1 3  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. HOWEVER, MISSION TIMELINE COULD BE 
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACTED WHEN A DUMP IS ATTEMPTED WITHOUT SENSORS 
(OR ERRONEOUS READING) AND FREEZING OCCURS. 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-166 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1221 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1120-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1221 
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  E P I  r I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  E l  f l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  C I  I 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-167 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1222 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1120-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1222 
I ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER (1) 
I LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
I NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
[ I  [ I  [ I  ~ IOA [ 2 /2  3 
COMPARE [ N /N ] I N 3  I N 1  E N 3  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
~ 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  E l  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1223 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1116-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1223 
ITEM: DUMP NOZZLE 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  I N 1  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
' [  / 1 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF LOSS OF FUNCTION IS CONSIDERED 
INABILITY TO EXPEL FUEL CELLS WATER. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-169 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1224 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1114-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1224 
ITEM: DUMP LINE HEATER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C l  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF LOSS OF FUNCTION (INABILITY TO EXPEL 
WATER) IS CONSIDERED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-170 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1225 
06-2-1114-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1225 
DUMP LINE HEATER (2) 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] I 1  [ I  E l  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-171 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1226 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1120-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1226 
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, LINE HEATER (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M . J .  SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  E P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-172 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1227 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1120-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1227 
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, DUMP LINE HEATER (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  I N 1  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-173 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-1228 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1135-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1228 
ITEM: QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 C F I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  E l  C J  
COMPARE [ N /N J C N I  C N I  r N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA DID NOT KNOW OF THE CAP. BASED ON THE SAME RATIONING AS 06- 
2-1124-2, HYDROPHOBIC FILTER, FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL LEAK INTO 
THE CABIN, THIS SHOULD BE 3/2R. LOSS OF FUNCTION WITH NO CREW 
INTERVENTION WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER 
(TANK B ONLY) INTO THE CABIN. ALSO, THE DUMP WITH X-TIE CAN 
STILL BE ACHIEVED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-174 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1228A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1162-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1228 
ITEM: QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA ( 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  1 1  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  C N 3  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 I F 1  [ F l  [ P I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA DID NOT KNOW OF THE CAP. BASED ON THE SAME RATIONING AS 06- 
2-1124-2, HYDROPHOBIC FILTER, FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL LEAK INTO 
THE CABIN, THIS SHOULD BE 3/2R. LOSS OF FUNCTION WITH NO CREW 
INTERVENTION WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER 
(TANK B ONLY) INTO THE CABIN. ALSO, THE DUMP WITH X-TIE CAN 
STILL BE ACHIEVED. THIS FMEA INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO LINES 
AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1135-2 (LS-1228). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-175 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1229 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1135-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1229 
ITEM: QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
I NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
I COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ X I  
E N 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-176 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1229A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1161-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1229 
ITEM: QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THIS F'MEA INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO 
ONE LINES AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1135-1 (LS-1229). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-177 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1230 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1113-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1230 
ITEM: SENSOR, DUMP LINE TEMPERATURE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J C I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 C I  E l  E l  
COMPARE [ / J r 3 '  1 3  1 3  
CIL 
ITEM 
1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  c 3  [ I  1 1  c 3  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1231 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1150-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1231 
ITEM: QD, ECLSS BAY (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  C F I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-179 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1232 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1150-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1232 
ITEM: QD, GALLEY/DISPENSER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X J 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-180 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1233 
06-2-1132-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1233 
LINES AND FITTINGS 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 1 1  [ I  I 1  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE FMEA ABOUT THE FAILURES OF THE 
RADIATOR AND ABS. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE ITEM 
BEING STUDIED. CONTINUOUS FLOW O F  WATER INTO THE MID-BODY OR 
CREW MODULE - LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE 
FCP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-181 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1233A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1162-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1233 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  1 1  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N ] I N 1  C N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE F'MEA, ABOUT THE FAILURES OF THE 
RADIATOR AND ABS. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE ITEM 
BEING STUDIED. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE MID-BODY OR 
CREW MODULE - LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE 
FCP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-182 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1234 
06-2-1156-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1234 
LINES AND FITTINGS 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I "  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
FOR LEAKAGE BETWEEN THE A/B AND B/C RELIEF VALVES: 1) CONTINUOUS 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
FLOW OF FCP (PRIME/ALTER) TO CREW CABIN - NO WAY TO ISOLATE LEAK 
WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE FUEL CELLS, 2) TANKS C/D AVAILABLE FOR 
RETURN WITH EXISTING LEAK. 
FOR LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE B/C RELIEF VALVE: - TANKS C AND D 
COULD BE ISOLATED, AND TANK B KEPT LOW IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE 
LEAKAGE - LESS SEVERE THAN PREVIOUS CASE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-183 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1235 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1235 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW ( X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  C l  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N J I N 1  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
1 I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 1 1  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS C/D TO BE SHUT 
DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE B, AND TWO 
TANKS RESERVE; - TANKS A AND B AND FES FEEDLINE A AVAILABLE. 
LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS A AND B TO BE 
SHUTDOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE A, 
PRIMARY DUMP, X-TIE FUNCTION, AND A/L SUPPORT; - ONLY TWO TANKS 
AVAILABLE PLUS FES FEEDLINE B. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-184 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1235A 
06-2-1164-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1235 
LINES AND FITTINGS 
M.J. SAIIDI 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 1 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS C/D TO BE SHUT 
DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE B, AND TWO 
TANKS RESERVE; - TANKS A AND B AND FES FEEDLINE A AVAILABLE. 
LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS A AND B TO BE 
SHUTDOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE A, 
PRIMARY DUMP, X-TIE FUNCTION, AND A/L SUPPORT; - ONLY TWO TANKS 
AVAILABLE PLUS FES FEEDLINE B. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-185 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1236 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1163-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1236 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 I N 3  I N 1  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, IF ANOTHER WAY IS AVAILABLE TO 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORT GALLEY. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1236A 
06-2-1155-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1236 
LINES AND FITTINGS 
M.J. SAIIDI 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THIS FMEA IS SAME AS 06-2-1163-2 (LS-1236) IN 
MUST BE ISOLATED (DISCONNECTING THE MICROBIAL 
IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK. IF OTHER MEANS TO 
REQUIREMENT FAILS, THEN MISSION WILL BE LOST. 
c-187 
WHICH THE TANK A 
CHECK VALVE QD'S) 
PROVIDE FOR GALLEY 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1237 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1237 
ITEM: WATER CHILLER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE ( N /N' 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  1 1  I 1  I 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I REMARKS : 
IOA WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT BASED ON ARS-FMEA (06-1-0530) WHEN IT 
IS RELEASED. 
I 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-188 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1238 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1119-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1238 
ITEM: WATER CHILLER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  I F 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
1 [ I  E l  [ I  
RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1250X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1124-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1250 
ITEM: FILTER, TANKS N2 INLET (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  E l  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF N2 PRESSURIZATION WITH THE BLADDERS EXPOSED TO THE CABIN 
PRESSURE. NO ADDITIONAL FAILURE IN THE SWS WILL NEGATE THE TANKS 
PRESSURIZATION BY THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE, UNLESS THE CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE IS LOST. THIS IS NOT REALISTIC WHEN APPLIED TO THE 
SWS. LOSS OF BLADDER WILL RESULT IN FLOW OF WATER INTO CABIN - 
MISSION LOSS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-190 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1251X 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-1126-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1251 
ITEM: LINES/FITTINGS AND QD, FCP ALTERNATE LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
IOA 
TWO 
AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SEE ALSO LS-1252X (06-2-1128-1). THE 
FMEAS MAY BE COMBINED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-191 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1252X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1128-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1252 
ITEM: LINES/FITTINGS AND QD, FCP ALTERNATE LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  c I *  
[ P I  [ NAI [ P I  r i  IOA [ 3 /1R 3 
COMPARE [ / ] E l  I 1  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  1 3  r i  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1253X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1126-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1253 
ITEM: LINES/FITTINGS AND QD, FCP ALTERNATE LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 1 1  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THE FUNCTIONAL LOSS WITH THIS FAILURE MODE, DOES NOT DEAD-HEAD 
THE FUEL CELLS, SINCE THE WATER WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY LEAKING OUT. 
ALSO SEE LS-1254X (06-2-1128-2)-THESE TWO FMEAS MAY BE COMBINED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-193 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1254X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1128-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1254 
ITEM: LINES/FITTINGS AND QD, FCP ALTERNATE LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: M . J .  SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
I HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ : I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THE FUNCTIONAL LOSS WITH THIS FAILURE MODE, DOES NOT DEAD-HEAD 
THE FWEL CELLS, SINCE THE WATER WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY LEAKING OUT. 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-194 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1255X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1103-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1255 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS, H2 VENT 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  I 1  E l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  [ N I  C N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E 2 / 2  1 [ I  E l  [ I  C A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE LOSS OF FUNCTION PLUS THIS FAILURE WILL ONLY RESULT IN 
INABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM WATER - WATER FROM FCP STILL FLOWS TO 
THE TANKS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-195 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1256X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1166-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1256 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS, A/L TO EMU 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF A/L SUPPORT FUNCTION WILL ONLY NEGATE THE EMU ACTIVITIES - MISSION LOSS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-196 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/28/87 
LS-1257X 
06-2-1166-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
1257 
LINES AND FITTINGS, A/L TO EMU 
M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ N I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER UNLESS TANKS A/B ARE ISOLATED. TWO 
TANKS (C AND D) ARE REMAINING TO SUPPORT NOMINAL MISSION. LOSS 
OF A/L SUPPORT FOR EMU ACTIVITY AND FES A, AND DUMP CAPABILITY. 
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES AND THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN 
MISSION TERMINATION AND RETURN ON TANKS C AND D WITH CONTINUOUS 
FLOW OF WATER FROM TANK B INTO THE CABIN. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-197 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1258X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2032-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1258 
ITEM: SWITCH, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
C 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-198 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1259X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2032-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1259 
ITEM: SWITCH, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M,J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  I 1  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPDCC DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED, 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-199 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-126OX 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2032-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [: 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1260 
ITEM: SWITCH, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 E l  E l  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 E N 1  I N 1  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-200 
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c.2 
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS 
c-201 
APPENOIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2001 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2001 
ITEM: URINAL, MALE AND FEMALE (1 TYPE PER CREW MEMBER) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  C N I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-202 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2002 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0116-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2002 
ITEM: URINAL, MALE AND FEMALE (1 TYPE PER CREW MEMBER) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO LATCH 
NASA F'M: INABILITY TO MATE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE URINAL ADAPTER FAILS TO LATCH THIS REQUIRES 
THE USE OF THE UCD SUPPLIES. THERE ARE ONLY 3 DAYS SUPPLY OF 
UCDs PER CREW MEMBER AND USE OF THEM MAY PRODUCE AN EARLY 
TERMINATION OF THE MISSION. CHANGE IOA CRITICALITY TO 3/2R PNP. 
A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY 
THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. 'IOFF NOMINAL" WAS 
DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY 
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, 
THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-203 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2002A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0116-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2002 
ITEM: URINAL, MALE AND FEMALE (1 TYPE PER CREW MEMBER) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] 
IOA [ 3 /2R ] 
[ I  
[ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO LATCH 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO DEMATE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE URINAL ADAPTER FAILS TO LATCH THIS REQUIRES 
THE USE OF THE UCD SUPPLIES. THERE ARE ONLY 3 DAYS SUPPLY OF 
UCDs PER CREW MEMBER AND USE OF THEM MAY PRODUCE AN EARLY 
TERMINATION OF THE MISSION. CHANGE IOA CRITICALITY TO 3/2R PNP. 
A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY 
THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL" WAS 
DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY 
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, 
THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-204 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2003 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-4 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2003 
ITEM: URINAL COUPLER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-205 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2004 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0105-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2004 
ITEM: URINAL CONICAL SCREEN PREFILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE REPLACEMENT SCREEN/FILTER ALSO BECOMES 
THERE ARE ONLY 3 DAYS SUPPLY PER CREW MEMBER OF THE UCDs. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
PLUGGED OR OTHERWISE DAMAGED, THEN THE UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. 
DEPENDING ON MISSION LIFE, A LOSS OF MISSION COULD BE PRODUCED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-206 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2005 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0105-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE E 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2005 
ITEM: URINAL CONICAL SCREEN PREFILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI c 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  c 1  c 
COMPARE [ /N 3 c N 1  I N 1  E 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAI c 
P I  
1 
N l  
c I *  
[ I  
I 1  
P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: DAMAGED ELEMENT 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE SCREEN IS DAMAGED OR DEVELOPS AN INTERNAL 
LEAK THERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE SYSTEM. HOWEVER AS A RESULT OF 
THE SCREEN FAILURE THE DOWNSTREAM SCREEN COULD BE DAMAGED BY 
RESTRICTED FLOW OR THE FAN/SEPARATORS PITOT TUBE COULD BECOME 
LINES. IF THE REDUNDANT PATH FAILS THEN THE UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE 
LOSS COULD BE PRODUCED WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP. 
BLOCKED, REQUIRING USE OF REDUNDANT URINAL OR FAN/SEPARATOR 
USED. THERE ARE ONLY 3 DAYS SUPPLIES OF THE UCDs AND A MISSION 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-207 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2006 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-0109-4 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2006 
ITEM: URINAL HOSE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
1 1  
I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-208 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2007 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0101-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2007 
ITEM: URINAL HOSE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ / 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY 
A B 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  NAI [ P I  1 1  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-209 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2008 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2008 
ITEM: URINAL ADAPTER QUICK RELEASE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
E N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: MISALIGNMENT 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO MATE 
IOA COMMENT: IF DEVELOP EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DUE TO MISALIGNMENT, 
MAY REQUIRE THE USE OF THE UCDs WITH THE RISK OF LOSS OF MISSION 
COULD POTENTIALLY ALLOW RELEASE OF BACTERIAL GROWTH INTO CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE. THE SPILL WOULD BE CONTAINABLE AND CLEANABLE, BUT 
DUE TO SUPPLY LIMITATIONS. 
=PORT DATE 03/10/88 c-210 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2008A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2008 
ITEM: URINAL ADAPTER QUICK RELEASE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 E l  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: MISALIGNMENT 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO DEMATE 
IOA COMMENT: IF DEVELOP EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DUE TO MISALIGNMENT, 
COULD POTENTIALLY ALLOW RELEASE OF BACTERIAL GROWTH INTO CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE. THE SPILL WOULD BE CONTAINABLE AND CLEANABLE, BUT 
REQUIRE THE USE OF THE UCDs WITH THE RISK OF LOSS OF MISSION DUE 
TO SUPPLY LIMITATIONS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-211 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2009 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2009 
ITEM: URINAL ADAPTER QUICK RELEASE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCWENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-212 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2010 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2010 
ITEM: URINAL HOSE CLAMP (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
[ P I  C NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ : I  C l  C l  
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
C I *  
[ I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E 3 /2R 1 [ P I  C NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA FM: IMPROPER CLAMPING FORCE 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO ATTACH 
IOA COMMENT: IF DEVELOP EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DUE TO MISALIGNMENT, 
COULD POTENTIALLY ALLOW RELEASE OF BACTERIAL GROWTH INTO CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE. THE SPILL WOULD BE CONTAINABLE, AND CLEANABLE, BUT 
MAY REQUIRE THE USE OF THE UCDs WITH THE RISK OF LOSS OF 
MISSION DUE TO SUPPLY LIMITATIONS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-213 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-201OA 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2010 
ITEM: URINAL HOSE CLAMP (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: IMPROPER CLAMPING FORCE 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO REMOVE 
IOA COMMENT: IF DEVELOP EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DUE TO MISALIGNMENT, 
MAY REQUIRE THE USE OF THE UCDs WITH THE RISK OF LOSS OF MISSION 
COULD POTENTIALLY ALLOW RELEASE OF BACTERIAL GROWTH INTO CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE. THE SPILL WOULD BE CONTAINABLE AND CLEANABLE, BUT 
DUE TO SUPPLY LIMITATIONS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-214 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2011 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2011 
ITEM: URINAL DYNATUBE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  c 3  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R I [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-215 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2012 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0101-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2012 
ITEM: URINAL DYNATUBE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 I 1  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
I 1  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  I NAI I P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-216 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2013 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0109-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2013 
ITEM: TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE IFM #026 ALLOWS A WORK-AROUND FOR THE CASE OF A 
CLOGGED EMU DRAIN LINE AND CHANGES THE CRITICALITY TO 3/2R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-217 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2013A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0444-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2013 
ITEM: TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ X I  
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE IFM #026 ALLOWS A WORK-AROUND FOR THE CASE OF A 
CLOGGED EMU DRAIN LINE AND CHANGES THE CRITICALITY TO 3/2R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-218 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2014 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0444-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2014 
ITEM: TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2  3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ X I  
COMPARE N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: THE IFM #026 ALLOWS A WORK-AROUND FOR THE CASE OF A 
CLOGGED EMU DRAIN LINE AND CHANGES THE CRITICALITY TO 3/2R PFP. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-219 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2015 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0444-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2015 
ITEM: EMU QD (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: THE IFM #26 BYPASSES THE EMU QD ENTIRELY SO THE 
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 3/2R PFP. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-220 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2016 
06-2-0203-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2016 
COMMODE STORAGE CONTAINER (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  c NAJ [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ P I  I P J  C J  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF AN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DEVELOPS IN THE TANK AND IF 
LEAKS DEVELOP IN THE COMMODE CONTROL VALVE AND THE MANUAL VACUUM 
VENT VALVE THEN AN UNCONTROLLED ATMOSPHERE LOSS WOULD BE 
POSSIBLE, THUS THE 3/1R PNP CRITICALITY. 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-221 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2017 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0206-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2017 
ITEM: COMMODE/LINER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] E N 1  [ N I  I N 1  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE, OPEN 
NASA FM: DAMAGED BAG 
IOA COMMENT: THE POTENTIAL FOR BACTERIAL GROWTH IS A MISSION 
CRITICAL CONDITION AND SHOULD RESULT IN A MISSION LOSS DUE TO 
POTENTIAL CREW DANGER. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-222 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2018 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0206-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2018 
ITEM: COMMODE UPPER RING (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 2 / 2  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: DAMAGED BAG 
IOA COMMENT: THE POTENIAL BACTERIA GROWTH IS A MISSION CRITICAL 
CONDITION AND SHOULD RESULT IN A MISSION LOSS DUE TO POTENTIAL 
CREW DANGER. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-223 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2019 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0202-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2019 
ITEM: COMMODE SLIDE VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C I  C N I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I "  
[ I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /1R 1 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: IN'IlERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO CLOSE 
NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE 
IOA COMMENT: IF BOTH THE COMMODE OUTLET AND MANUAL VACUUM VENT 
VALVES DEVELOP INTERNAL LEAKS, THEN A CABIN PRESSURE LOSS WOULD 
RESULT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMMODE SLIDE VALVE EXTERNAL 
LEAKAGE. THIS WOULD BE A LIFE THREATENING CONDITION, FOR A 3/1R 
PNP CRITICALITY. 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-224 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2019A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0202-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2019 
ITEM: COMMODE SLIDE VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ ' I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARXS : 
IOA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO CLOSE 
NASA FM: LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF BOTH THE COMMODE OUTLET AND MANUAL VACUUM VENT 
VALVES DEVELOP INTERNAL LEAKS, THEN A CABIN PRESSURE LOSS WOULD 
RESULT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMMODE SLIDE VALVE EXTERNAL 
LEAKAGE. 
PNP CRITICALITY. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THIS WOULD BE A LIFE THREATENING CONDITION, FOR A 3/1R 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-225 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2020 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0202-1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2020 
ITEM: COMMODE SLIDE VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
I IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
1 1  
~ 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2021 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0219-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2021 
ITEM: COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C I  C l  E l  C I  
COMPARE [ /N ] I N 1  C N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING 
NASA FM: JAMMED MID-STROKE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE TANK BECOMES TO FAIL DUE TO LOSS OF 
COMPACTOR, THEN THE CREW MUST RESORT TO FCB, WHICH MAY PRODUCE AN 
ALTERATION IN THE MISSION TIME-LINE DUE TO CREW INCONVENIENCE, 
AND NECESSITATING A 3/2R PNP CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-227 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2022 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0203-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2022 
ITEM: COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N I C I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
c 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ NAI C P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
RE-: 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF BOTH THE COMMODE OUTLET AND MANUAL VACUUM VENT 
VALVES DEVELOP INTERNAL LEAKS, THEN A CABIN PRESSURE LOSS WOULD 
RESULT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT EXTERNAL 
LEAKAGE. THIS WOULD BE A LIFE THREATENING CONDITION, FOR A 3/1R 
PNP CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-228 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2023 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2023 
ITEM: COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
/NA 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA COMMENT: THIS FAILURE COVERED WAS UNDER MDAC ID 2021. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
DELETE ANALYSIS SHEET 2023. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2024 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0203-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2024 
ITEM: COMMODE BOTTOM FLANGE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ I  I N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF BOTH THE COMMODE CUTLET AND MANUAL VACUUM VENT 
VALVES DEVELOP INTERNAL LEAKS, AS WELL AS THE EXTERNAL LEAK OF 
THE COMMODE BOTTOM FLANGE, THEN A CABIN PRESSURE LOSS WOULD 
RESULT. THIS WOULD BE A LIFE THREATENING CONDITION, FOR A 3/1R 
PNP CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-230 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2025 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2025 
ITEM: COMMODE BOTTOM FLANGE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA / 1 [ I  1 1  C l  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  E l  c 3  c 3  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ /NA 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA COMMENT: THIS FAILURE MODE WAS COVERED UNDER MDAC ID 2024. 
DELETE ANALYSIS SHEET 2025. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-231 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2026 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-02 18-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2026 
ITEM: COMMODE EXIT, MESH SCREEN (1) 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
I ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
[ P I  c NAI [ P I  
c p 1  [ P I  [ P I  
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ / ] e 1  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
e I *  
e 1  
e 1  
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAJ c p 3  C J  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2027 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2027 
ITEM: COMMODE EXIT, MESH SCREEN (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  C I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ /NA 1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
DELETE FAILURE MODE OF "FAIL OPEN". THIS WAS DETERMINED TO BE 
"NON-CREDIBLE" AT CCB FOR NASA FMEA 06-2C-0218-1. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-233 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2028 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0219-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2028 
ITEM: COMMODE MOVEABLE AND STATIONARY VANES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] 
[ P I  
[ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] ' I N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: RUPTURE 
NASA FM: FAILS TO COMPACT, TORN NET 
IOA COMMENT: THIS FAILURE IS SIMILAR TO THE JAMMED COMPACTOR 
DRIVER MECHANISM (MDAC ID 2021) IN THAT THE SOLID WASTE CANNOT BE 
PACKED WITH POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE COMMODE IS A RESULT AND FCB 
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. POTENTIAL MISSION TIME LINE EFFECT 
DUE TO CREW INCONVENIENCE AND A CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-234 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2029 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0403-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2029 
ITEM: AUX. WET TRASH VENT LINE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ ' / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAK 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2030 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0403-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2030 
ITEM: AUX. WET TRASH VENT LINE QD (ij 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  1 3  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 
INADEQUATE [ 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-236 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2031 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0403-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2031 
ITEM: VACUUM PORT LINE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  E l  [: I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  c 3  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 / 3  1 [ I  1 1  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2032 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0403-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2032 
ITEM: VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  C I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 / 3  1 1 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-238 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2033 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2033 
ITEM: VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  1 P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2034 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (1) 
I 2034 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I "  
[ I  
[ I  
3 /2R 3 1 1  
* (ADD/DELETE) 
V I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO MATE/DEMATE 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2035 
06-2-0404-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2035 
WET TRASH VENT LINE (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  I N 1  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
VENT VALVE AS WELL AS THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IN THE WET TRASH VENT 
LINE WOULD PRODUCE AN UNRESTRICTED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS WHICH 
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND A CRITICALITY 3/1R PNP. 
IOA COMMENT: IF AN INTERNAL LEAK DEVELOPS IN THE MANUAL VACUUM 
C-241 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2036 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0403-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2036 
ITEM: WET TRASH VENT LINE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY N3DUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 
INADEQUATE [ 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2037 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0403-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2037 
ITEM: WET TRASH VENT QD (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /3 . ]  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 
COMPARE [ / ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (I 
1 3 / 3  1 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
E 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: 
REMARKS : 
CIL 
ITEM 
1 I 
1 
1 
1 [ I  c I *  
1 [ I  [ I  
1 C I  I 1  
erent   om NASA) 
1 [ I  [ I  r 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
(If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [: 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2038 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-0101-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2038 
ITEM: URINE COLLECTION HOSES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
E l  
[ I  
ADD/DELETE 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2039 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2039 
ITEM: URINE COLLECTION HOSES 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  1 1  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2040 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2040 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS QD (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
NASA [ 2 /2 J I 1  1 3  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N J C N I  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW BUT ALSO INCLUDES ARS LINES. 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE QD BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY 
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD 
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED, THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE 
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS 
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. 
THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY 
I NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE 
ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE 
NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2040A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2040 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS QD (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  1 1  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N J I N 1  [ N l  [ N l  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE QD BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY 
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD 
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE 
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS 
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. 
THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY 
NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE 
ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE 
NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2041 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2 -04 3 5-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2041 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS QD (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /2  3 [ I  c 3  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 E l  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
E X 1  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 2 / 2  1 E l  1 1  E l  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2041A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2041 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS QD (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  I 1  [ I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  C '  1 [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  E l  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2042 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2042 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS LINE (1) 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
I ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
NASA [ 2 /2 J [ I  [ I  E l  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ 2 / 2  1 I 1  C I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
I 
I ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2042A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2042 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS LINE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2  3 [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  1 1  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2043 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2043 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA F'M: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-252 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2043A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2043 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  C A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2044 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2044 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  E l  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DYNATUBE BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY 
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD 
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE 
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS 
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. 
THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY 
NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE 
ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPmNT. THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE 
NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-254 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-2044A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2044 
ITEM: WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) I 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DYNATUBE BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY 
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD 
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE 
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS 
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. 
THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY 
NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE 
ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE 
NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-255 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2045 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0216-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2045 
ITEM: COMMODE CONTROL HANDLE LINKAGE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI I P J  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 I 1  C N 1  1 1  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO SWITCH, LOSS OF OUTPUT, BINDING 
NASA FM: JAMMED LINKAGE, VACUUM VENT POSITION 
IOA COMMENT: CHANGE SCREEN B IN THE MDAC ANALYSIS TO N/A BECAUSE 
FCBs ARE AN OFF-LINE REDUNDANT SYSTEM. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2045A 
06-2-0216-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2045 
COMMODE CONTROL HANDLE LINKAGE (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 1 1  I N 1  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
c 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO SWITCH, LOSS OF OUTPUT, BINDING 
NASA FM: JAMMED LINKAGE, MID-STROKE POSITION 
IOA COMMENT: THE JAMMED LINKAGE IS A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE IF A SECOND FAILURE OCCURS, THUS THE 3/1R CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 (2-257 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2045B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0216-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2045 
ITEM: COMMODE CONTROL HANDLE LINKAGE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 E N 1  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO SWITCH, LOSS OF OUTPUT, BINDING 
NASA FM: JAMMED LINKAGE, FECAL COLLECTION POSITION 
I 
I 1OA COMMENT: IF THE LINKAGE IS JAMMED IN THIS POSITION HOW IS IT 
POSSIBLE TO CLOSE THE GATE VALVE, WHICH WOULD BE A 3/2R PNP 
CRITICALITY? 
A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY 
THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. 'IOFF NOMINAL" WAS 
DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY 
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, 
THE NASA FIWA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2045C 
06-2-0216-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2045 
COMMODE CONTROL HANDLE LINKAGE (1) 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ /N ] 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO SWITCH, LOSS OF OUTPUT, BINDING 
NASA FM: BROKEN LINKAGE TO REPRESS, SLIDE,  BALLAST VALVE (FECAL 
POSITION) 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE LINKAGE IS JAMMED IN THIS POSITION HOW IS IT 
POSSIBLE TO CLOSE THE GATE VALVE, WHICH WOULD BE A 3/1R PNP 
CRITICALITY? 
A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY 
THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL" WAS 
DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY 
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, 
THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-259 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2045D 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0216-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2045 
ITEM: COMMODE CONTROL HANDLE LINKAGE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 C P J  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO SWITCH, LOSS OF OUTPUT, BINDING 
NASA FM: BROKEN LINKAGE TO REPRESS AND BALLAST VALVE (VACUUM 
VENT POSITION) 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2045E 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0216-6 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2045 
ITEM: COMMODE CONTROL HANDLE LINKAGE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  E l  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO SWITCH, LOSS OF OUTPUT, BINDING 
NASA FM: BROKEN LINKAGE TO REPRESS AND BALLAST VALVE (VACUUM 
VENT POSITION) 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE LINKAGE IS JAMMED IN THIS POSITION HOW IS IT 
POSSIBLE TO CLOSE THE GATE VALVE, WHICH WOULD BE A 3/1R PNP 
CRITICALITY? 
A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY 
THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL" WAS 
DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY 
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, 
THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-261 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2045F 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0216-7 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2045 
ITEM: COMMODE CONTROL HANDLE LINKAGE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO SWITCH, LOSS OF OUTPUT, BINDING 
NASA FM: BROKEN LINKAGE TO REPRESS AND BALLAST VALVE (VACUUM 
VENT POSITION) 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2046 
06-2-0401-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2046 
MANUAL VENT VALVE (1) 
K. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] 
COMPARE [ / 3 
BARICKMAN 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
I *  
E l  
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 1 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-263 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2047 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0401-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2047 
ITEM: MANUAL VENT VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N I ' 1 3  [ N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
1 3  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAK 
IOA COMMENT: WITH AN INTERNAL LEAK OF THE MANUAL VACUUM VENT 
VALVE THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO CABIN 
DEPRESSURIZATION IF A SEAL ON THE COMMODE CONTROL VALVE GOES 
llBAD" AND LEAKS. THE CRITICALITY BECOMES 3/1R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-264 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2048 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0401-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2048 
ITEM: MANUAL VENT VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /1R 1 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE VALVE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DEVELOPS SUCH THAT 
THE AIR FLOW IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE VALVE CONTROLLER (PAST 2 SEALS) 
THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE WOULD BE POSSIBLE DUE TO 
UNCONTROLLED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS IF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION 
VALVE DID NOT FUNCTION TO RESTRICT THE AIR FLOW. THE RECOMMENDED 
CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/1R PNP. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION 
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE 
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST 
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING 
CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-265 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2049 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0208-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2049 
ITEM: COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 1 3  [ N l  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO OPEN 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO TRANSFER, STUCK IN FECAL POSITION 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2049A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0208-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2049 
ITEM: COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  c I "  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-267 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2050 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0208-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2050 
ITEM: COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N J C J  I N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO TRANSFER, STUCK IN VENT POSITION 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE AND THE MANUAL 
VACUUM VENT VALVE BOTH DEVELOP 1NTERNAL.LEAKAGES THEN A POTENTIAL 
LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO CABIN DE-PRESSURIZATION IS POSSIBLE. THE 
RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY CHANGE TO THE IOA ANALYSIS IS 
3/1R PNP. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2050A 
06-2-0208-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2050 
COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE (1) 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R ] 
COMPARE [ /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I 3 /1R 1 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE AND THE MANUAL 
VACUUM VENT VALVE BOTH DEVELOP INTERNAL LEAKAGES THEN A POTENTIAL 
LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO CABIN DE-PRESSURIZATION IS POSSIBLE. THE 
RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY CHANGE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS IS 
3/1R PNP. 
C-269 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-2051 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0208-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2051 
ITEM: COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /1R 1 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE DEVELOPS AN 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE AND A INTERNAL LEAKAGE ON THE MANUAL VACUUM VENT 
VALVE THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE COULD OCCUR AND THE IOA 
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE CHANGED TO 3/1R PNP. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2052 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0209-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2052 
ITEM: COMMODE PRESSURIZATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO OPEN 
NASA F'M: INABILITY TO OPEN, STUCK IN FECAL POSITION 
IOA COMMENT: CHANGE B SCREEN ON THE IOA ANALYSIS TO N/A 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-271 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2052A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0209-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2052 
ITEM: COMMODE PRESSURIZATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  E l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: CHANGE B SCREEN ON THE IOA ANALYSIS TO N/A 
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED 
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE 
REDUNDANT PATHS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2053 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0209-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2053 
ITEM: COMMODE PRESSURIZATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  1 1  E l  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA F'M: INABILITY TO CLOSED, STUCK IN REPRESS POSITION 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE VALVE DOES NOT ALLOW COMPLETE FLOW TO THE 
FAN/SEPARATOR, HAVE SUSTAINED A POTENTIAL LOSS OF EFFICEINCY AND 
THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR 
INSUFFICEINT SUPPLIES FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS LOSS OF 
MISSION POTENTIAL. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 3/2R PNP. A 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY THE 
IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL" WAS DEFINED 
AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE 
COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, THE 
NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2053A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0209-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2053 
ITEM: COMMODE PRESSURIZATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  I N 1  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA F'M: LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE VALVE DOES NOT ALLOW COMPLETE FLOW TO THE 
FAN/SEPARATOR, HAVE SUSTAINED A POTENTIAL LOSS OF EFFICEINCY AND 
THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR 
INSUFFICEINT SUPPLIES FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS LOSS OF 
MISSION POTENTIAL. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 3/2R PNP. A 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY THE 
IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL1' WAS DEFINED 
AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE 
COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, THE 
NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/2 2/8 7 
LS-2054 
06-2-0209-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2054 
COMMODE PRESSURIZATION VALVE (1) 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ /N ] 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
I I *  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: mAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE VALVE DOES NOT ALLOW COMPLETE FLOW TO THE 
FAN/SEPARATOR, HAVE SUSTAINED A POTENTIAL LOSS OF EFFICEINCY AND 
THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR 
INSUFFICEINT SUPPLIES FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS LOSS OF 
MISSION POTENTIAL. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 3/2R PNP. A 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY THE 
IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL'I WAS DEFINED 
AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE 
COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, THE 
NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-275 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2055 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0213-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2055 
ITEM: BALLAST AIR CONTROL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C N I  [ : I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO TRANSFER, STUCK IN VACUUM VENT POSITION. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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ASSESSMENT DATE : 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2055A 
06-2-0213-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2055 
BALLAST AIR CONTROL VALVE (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
[ P I  c NAI [ P I  I I *  NASA [ 3 /2R ] 
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 I 1  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-277 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2056 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0213-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2056 
ITEM: BALLAST AIR CONTROL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 1 1  1 3  1 1  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c 3 / 3  1 [ I  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO TRANSFER, STUCK IN FECAL POSITION 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2056A 
06-2-0213-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2056 
BALLAST AIR CONTROL VALVE (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
[ I  [ I  1 1  IOA [ 3 /3 3 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I "  
1 1  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA F'M: INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-279 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2057 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0213-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2057 
ITEM: BALLAST AIR CONTROL VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2058 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0214-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2058 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW 
NASA FM: STUCK IN EITHER SEPARATOR POSITION 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-281 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2058A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0214-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2058 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  C I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 3 [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ P I  NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2059 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0214-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2059 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/I?UNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ( 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E l  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA M: STUCK IN EITHER SEPARATOR POSITION 
IOA COMMENT: IF UNABLE TO SWITCH TO ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR 
POSITION, MUST RESORT TO FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD 
SUPPLIES MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR LIFE OF MISSION, THUS 
CRITICALITY CHANGE OF THE IOA ANALYSIS TO 3/2R PNP. 
ADEQUATE ( 3 
INADEQUATE ( 3 
C-283 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2060 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0214-4 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2060 
ITEM: SEPARATOR VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ : I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  E 3  
COMPARE [ '/ ] [ I  C l  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ : I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2061 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2061 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO SEPARATE OR PROCESS LIQUIDS 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
C-285 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2062 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2062 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKI" 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  c NAJ [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  C P J  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 
I * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED WATER FLOW 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO PROCESS LIQUIDS 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-286 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2062A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2062 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED WATER FLOW 
NASA FM: FAN INOPERABLE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-287 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2062B 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-0110-4 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2062 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2 ) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED WATER FLOW 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO REACH SPEED 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-288 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2063 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2063 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2 ) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
[ P I  [ P I  [ P I  IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
C J  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO OPERATE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-289 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2063A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2063 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2) 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
, ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO SEPARATE OR PROCESS LIQUIDS 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-290 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2063B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2063 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [: NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: FAN INOPERABLE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-291 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2063C 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-4 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2063 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 I 1  [ N J  1 3  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
c 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO REACH SPEED 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-292 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2064 
06-2-0442-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2064 
FAN/SEPARATORS (2) 
K. BARICICMAN 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 3  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 C P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
C-293 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2065 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2065 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR TEST PORTS (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  1 1  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-294 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2066 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2066 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR TEST PORTS (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
[ I  1 1  C l  COMPARE [ N /N ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
c 3 / 3  1 C l  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
C-295 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2067 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0215-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2067 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR INLET HOSE FROM COMMODE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  1 I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 3  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N l  C N I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE EXTERNAL LEAK DEVELOPS THERE IS A POTENTIAL 
FOR BACTERIAL GROWTH WHICH COULD BE HAZARDOUS TO THE CREW AND 
REQUIRING AN EARLY MISSION TERMINATION. CHANGE IOA ANAYLSIS 
CRITICALITY TO 3/2R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-296 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2068 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2068 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR INLET HOSE FROM URINAL (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  t N  
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
1 [ I  
1 [ P I  
I I *  
E l  
1 [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-297 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2069 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0101-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2069 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR INLET HOSE FROM URINAL (1) 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
I ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ p :  [ P I  [ P I  
~ COMPARE [ / 3 1 1  C N I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
C l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-298 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2070 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0302-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2070 
ITEM: DUAL CHECK VALVES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 I 1  C I  C I  1 1  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  C N I  [ N l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ P I  I F 1  [ P I  C A I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
3 /2R 1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
I O A  COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE FIRST SINGLE CHECK VALVE (CV) IS 
NOT A MISSION INPACT, HOWEVER IF THE SECOND CV FAILS TO CLOSE, 
THEN THERE IS POTENTIAL CONTAMINATION OF THE WCS OUTLET DUCT AND 
MUFFLER THROUGH THE OFF-LINE FAN/SEPARATOR BECAUSE OF THE 
WASTE TANK PRESSURIZATON SYSTEM. MUST RESORT TO FCB AND UCD 
SUPPLIES WHICH MAY NOT LAST MISSION DURATION - CRITICALITY 3/2R 
PNP . 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-299 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2071 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: ' 2071 
ITEM: DUAL CHECK VALVES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 I 1  I 1  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E A 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE EXTERNAL LEAK DEVELOPS THERE IS A POTENTIAL 
FOR BACTERIAL GROWTH WHICH COULD BE HAZARDOUS TO THE CREW AND 
REQUIRING AN EARLY MISSION TERMINATION. CHANGE IOA ANALYSIS 
CRITICALITY TO 2/2. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-300 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2072 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0302-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2072 
ITEM: DUAL CHECK VALVES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-301 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2073 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0442-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2073 
ITEM: HOSE ASSEMBLY, SEPARATOR TO CHECK VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
I 
I NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
~ COMPARE [ / 3 t 3  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
I’ 1 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
I ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-302 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2074 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0442-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2074 
ITEM: MUFFLER HOUSING INLET DUCT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
'A 1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, POTENTIAL FOR BACTERIAL 
INFECTIONS 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE EXTERNAL LEAK DEVELOPS THERE IS A POTENTIAL 
FOR BACTERIAL GROWTH WHICH COULD BE HAZARDOUS TO THE CREW AND 
REQUIRING AN EARLY MISSION TERMINATION. CHANGE IOA ANALYSIS 
CRITICALITY TO 3/2R PNP. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-303 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2075 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0115-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2075 
ITEM: BACTERIA FILTER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 1 
I 
I 
NASA [ /NA 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
I /NA 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: OPEN; INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: DETEMINED TO BE "NON-CREDIBLE" BY THE CCB 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2076 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0211-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2076 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE SCREEN (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] C l  1 1  1 3  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  C N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKED 
IOA COMMENT: UNABLE TO REPRESSURIZE COMMODE AND NO BALLAST FLOW 
FOR URINAL REQUIRES USE OF FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES.  THERE MAY NOT 
BE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES FOR MISSION DURATION THUS CRITICALITY 3/2R 
PNP . 
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED 
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE 
REDUNDANT PATHS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-305 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2077 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0119-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2077 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE ASSEMBLY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/RJNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE 3 E 3  E N 1  c 3  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
c 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAI c p 1  C I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA FM: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, RESTRICTED 
FLOW 
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2077A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0119-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2077 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE ASSEMBLY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, RESTRICTED 
NASA FM: FAILED IN TRASH CAN POSITION 
NOTE: IF GET A RESTRICTED FLOW THEN MAY GET A MISSION CRITICAL 
CONDITION DUE TO NOXIOUS FUMES OR BACTERIAL GROWTH. 
IOA COMMENT: A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R 
CRITICALITY BY THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF 
NOMINAL" WAS DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF 
CONTINGENCY WASTE 
COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, THE 
NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-307 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2077B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0119-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2077 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE ASSEMBLY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  E l  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] E N 3  [ N l  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, RESTRICTED 
FLOW 
NASA FM: FAILED IN TRASH CAN POSITION 
NOTE ON IOA FMEA: IF GET A RESTRICTED FLOW THEN MAY GET A 
MISSION CRITICAL CONDITION DUE TO NOXIOUS mTMES OR BACTERIAL 
GROWTH. 
IOA COMMENT: A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R 
CRITICALITY BY THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF 
NOMINAL" WAS DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF 
CONTINGENCY WASTE 
COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, THE 
NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-308 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2078 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0119-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2078 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE ASSEMBLY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: UNABLE TO REPRESSURIZE COMMODE AND NO BALLAST FLOW 
FOR URINAL REQUIRES USE OF FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THERE MAY NOT 
BE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES FOR MISSION DURATION THUS CRITICALITY 3/2R 
PNP . 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 (2-309 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2079 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0201-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2079 
ITEM: COMMODE SEAT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  1 3  C I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3 1 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO LATCH 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-310 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2080 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0201-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2080 
ITEM: COMMODE SEAT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 C I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
[ N l  [ N l  I N 1  I 1  COMPARE [ /N ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA F'M: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO LATCH 
IOA COMMENT: IF COMMODE SEAT CAN NOT BE MOVED INTO POSITION THEN 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF WCS COMMODE USAGE AND A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R 
PNP . 
A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY 
THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL" WAS 
DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY 
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, 
THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-311 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2081 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0201-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2081 
ITEM: SEAT BASE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICK?" 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 1 3  E l  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] I 1  1 3  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
C I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 3 / 3  1 C I  [ I  C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2082 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0502-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2082 
ITEM: THIGH BAR RESTRAINT (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
NASA FM: FAILED I N  l'NON-USE1* POSITION 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-313 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2083 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2083 
ITEM: VELCRO RESTRAINT HARNESS (THIGH) (4) 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] E l  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  C I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 1 3  1 
I * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE ( 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: CLIP FAILURE 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY.BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2084 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0503-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2084 
ITEM: FOOT RESTRAINT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  1 1  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ N I  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 1 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILED IN llSTOWED1l POSITION 
NASA FM: FAILED IN "UP" POSITION 
IOA COMMENT: PROBABLY CREW INCONVENIENCE, BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO 
USE COMMODE. CHANGE IOA ANALYSIS CRITICALITY TO 3/3. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-315 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2085 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0503-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2085 
ITEM: FOOT RESTRAINT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  I 1  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  E l  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILED IN DEPLOYED POSITION 
NASA FM: FAILED IN 88DOWN" POSITION 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-316 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2086 
06-2-0504-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2086 
TOE BAR RESTRAINT (1) 
R. BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FTJNC A B 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] E l  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  c 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SCREENS 
C 
1 [ I  
1 E l  
1 [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN IN OPERABLE POSITION, FAILS CLOSED 
NASA FM: JAMMED 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-317 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2087 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0504-1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2087 
ITEM: TOE BAR RESTRAINT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
I COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  3 [ I  E 3  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILED IN DEPLOYED POSITION 
NASA FM: JAMMED 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-318 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2088 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW E I 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2088 
ITEM: APOLLO FECAL BAG (MISSION LIFE SUPPLY) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-319 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2089 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW 1 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2089 
ITEM: URINE COLLECTION DEVICE (3 DAYS SUPPLY PER 
CREWMEMBER) 
LEAD ANALYST: R. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ / 1 1 1  1 1  1 1  1 I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 1  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  1 N l  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-320 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2090 
06-2-0207-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2090 
COMMODE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA ( 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  C I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE 
NASA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, OUT OF TOLERANCE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-321 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2091 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0117-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2091 
ITEM: WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  C I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: FAILS OPEN 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-322 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2092 
06-2-0117-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2092 
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SWITCH (1) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
[ N l  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED CONTACT 
NASA F'M: FAILS CLOSED 
IOA COMMENT: A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R 
CRITICALITY BY THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF 
NOMINAL" WAS DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF 
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. 
HOWEVER, THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL 
FAILURE CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-323 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2093 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0117-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2093 
ITEM: WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA M: FAILS OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IN THE EVENT OF A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE 
FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR OR THERMOSTATIC SWITCH, THE WCS FUNCTION 
COULD BE LOST THUS FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THERE MAY 
NOT BE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES FOR MISSION DURATION AND CRITICALITY 
CHANGE OF THE IOA ANAYLSIS TO 3/2R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-324 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2094 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0117-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2094 
ITEM: WCS MODE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: FAILS OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IN THE EVENT OF A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE 
FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR OR THERMOSTATIC SWITCH, THE WCS FUNCTION 
COULD BE LOST THUS FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THERE MAY 
NOT BE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES FOR MISSION DURATION AND CRITICALITY 
CHANGE TO THE IOA ANALYSIS TO 3/2R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-325 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2095 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0117-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2095 
ITEM: WCS MODE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N I I N 1  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
1 1  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: FAILS CLOSED 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
IOA COMMENT: A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R 
CRITICALITY BY THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. 'IOFF 
NOMINAL" WAS DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE O F  
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. 
HOWEVER, THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL 
FAILURE CRITICALITY. 
~ REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-326 C -  5. 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-2096 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0117-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2096 
ITEM: WCS MODE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN 
NASA FM: FAILS OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IN THE EVENT OF A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE 
FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR OR THERMOSTATIC SWITCH, THE WCS FUNCTION 
COULD BE LOST THUS FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THERE MAY 
NOT BE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES FOR MISSION DURATION AND CRITICALITY 
CHANGE TO THE IOA ANALYSIS TO 3/2R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-327 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2097 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0118-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2097 
ITEM: WCS FAN/SEPARATOR RELAY (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 3  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
E N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: FAILS OPEN 
~ REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-328 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2098 
06-2-0118-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2098 
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR RELAY (2) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ /N ] 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY 
A B 
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
1 [ I  
1 [ P I  
c I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: FAILS CLOSED 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE RELAY FAILS, THEN MUST RESORT TO THE 
ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATORS. IF THE ALTERNATE FAN/SEPERATOR FAILS 
THEN MUST RESORT TO FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD 
SUPPLIES MAY NOT BE SUFFICEINT FOR MISSION DURATION. 
A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY 
THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL'* WAS 
DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY 
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, 
THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-329 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2099 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2099 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR NOISE SUPPRESSION CIRCUIT (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  C I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
c 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FX: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
1 
1 
I 
i 
I 
1 
I 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1 
R 
1 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2100 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2100 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR NOISE SUPPRESSION CIRCUIT(4) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-331 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2101 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2101 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR THERMOSTATIC SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR ' 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 I C-332 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2102 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2102 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR THERMOSTATIC SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 E l  [ N l  [ : I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
NASA F'M: INABILITY TO OPERATE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE ( 3 
c-333 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2102A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
I 
I 
I 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2102 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR THERMOSTATIC SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
NASA FM: FAN INOPERABLE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2102B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2102 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR THERMOSTATIC SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO REACH SPEED 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-335 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2103 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0505-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2103 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR BYPASS SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICK" 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE 
NASA FM: FAILED "OFF", SHORT OR OPEN 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2104 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0505-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2104 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR BYPASS SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  C J  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
NASA FM: FAILED IN IrONrr POSITION, INADVERTENT OPERATION 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-337 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2105 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2008-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2105 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS CNTLR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FWNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, OPENS 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-338 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2106 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2008-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2106 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS CNTLR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
NASA F'M: FAILS TO OPEN MANUALLY 
IOA COMMENT: IF A CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS TO OPEN, EITHER MANUALLY 
OR AUTOMATICALLY, THE CURRENT LIMITING EFFECT WOULD BE LOST. 
THEREFORE A POTENTIALLY LIFE THREATENING CONDITION WOULD EXIST IF 
AN ELECTRICAL SHORT OCCURRED. THERE WOULD BE A POTENTIAL FOR 
FIRE, WHICH IS A LIFE THREATENING CONDITION. THUS THE 1R STATUS 
FOR THE IOA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-339 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2107 
NASA FMEA t :  06-2-0110-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2107 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] C l  C N I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO OPERATE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2107A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2107 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKI" 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO SEPARATE OR PROCESS LIQUIDS 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-341 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2107B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2107 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2) 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
I ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
, COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  E N 1  E l  
CIL 
ITEM 
E N 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: FAN INOPERABLE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2107C 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-4 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2107 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R ] 
COMPARE [ / 3 
BARICKMAN 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO REACH SPEED 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2108 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2108 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
I [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  NASA [ 3 /2R 3 IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  C N I  c 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
I 
I 
CIL 
ITEM 1 
I 
C N I  
C A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  
I * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORT 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO OPERATE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2108A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2108 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2 ) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORT 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO SEPARATE OR PROCESS LIQUIDS 
c-345 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2108B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2108 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] I 1  I N 1  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C 3 /2R 3 C P I  E NAI C P I  C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: FAN INOPERABLE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-346 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
II 
I 
1 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2108C 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0110-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2108 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO REACH SPEED 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2109 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2007-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2109 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS FAN/SEPARATOR, AC BUS, 
SINGLE PHASE (6) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
NASA FM: OPEN 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-348 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2110 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2007-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2110 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS FAN/SEPARATOR, AC BUS, 
SINGLE PHASE (6) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] E 3  I 1  [ I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN MANUALLY 
IOA COMMENT: IF A CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS TO OPEN, EITHER MANUALLY 
OR AUTOMATICALLY, THE CURRENT LIMITING EFFECT WOULD BE LOST. 
THEREFORE A POTENTIALLY LIFE THREATENING CONDITION WOULD EXIST IF 
AN. ELECTRICAL SHORT OCCURRED. THERE WOULD BE A POTENTIAL FOR 
FIRE, WHICH IS A LIFE THREATENING CONDITION- THUS THE 1R STATUS 
FOR THE IOA ANALYSIS- 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-349 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2111 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2111 
ITEM: WWS LINE, UNIONS, AND JUNCTIONS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 1 3  [ I  1 3  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  1 1  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2112 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2112 
ITEM: WWS LINE, UNIONS, AND JUNCTIONS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  E l  E l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2113 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2113 
ITEM: ARS CONDENSATE SUPPLY TUBE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E A 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2114 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2114 
ITEM: ARS CONDENSATE SUPPLY TUBE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  1 1  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-353 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2115 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 
NEW [ 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2115 
ITEM: CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N I  E N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
3 
3 
I "  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS F'MEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2116 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0311-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2116 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 INLET VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  1 1  1 1  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2117 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0311-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2117 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 INLET VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA ( 3 /2R J [ P I  c NAJ E P J  
IOA [ 3 /3 J E 3  [ I  C J  
CIL 
ITEM 
I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE 
IOA COMMENT: IF IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CLOSE THE VALVE AFTER A 
FAILURE OF THE WASTE TANK BLADDER THEN IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO 
ISOLATE THE WASTE TANK TO PREVENT POTENTIAL INGESTION OF THE 
WASTE FLUIDS INTO THE NITROGEN PRESSURE SYSTEM AND LOSS OF 
MISSION. 
CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP. 
=PORT DATE 03/10/88 C-356 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2118 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0311-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2118 
ITEM: WAIST TANK 1 INLET VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F’UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
c-357 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2119 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-03 12-4 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2119 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
I 
I 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
I ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE (WATER TO NITROGEN) 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2120 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0312-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2120 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2121 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0312-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2121 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 LINER (BELLOWS) (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
I 
I 
I 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2122 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0436-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ( 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2122 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 INLET LINES AND COUPLINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA ( 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  e 3  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE ( 3 
INADEQUATE ( ] 
C-361 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2123 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0436-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2123 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 OUTLET LINES AND COUPLINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE OUTLET LINES AND 
FITTINGS IS NOT A HAZARD UNLESS AN INTERNAL LEAK DEVELOPS IN 
EITHER THE OUTLET VALVE OR IN THE DRAIN QD, IN WHICH CASE THE 
CRITICALITY WOULD BE LOSS OF MISSON POSSIBILITY DUE TO WASTE 
FLUIDS IN THE CREW CABIN. CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2123A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0437-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2123 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 OUTLET LINES AND COUPLINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICIU" 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
C l  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA COMMENT: THE REDUNDANT HARDWARE, THE OUTLET DRAIN VALVE, IS 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
IOA/NASA FM:' EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
OFF LINE UNTIL POWERED UP, THUS A B SCREEN N/A. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-363 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2124 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0313-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2124 
ITEM: WASTE TANK FLUID LEVEL TRANSDUCER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  1 1  C l  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LOSS OF OUTPUT 
NASA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, OUT OF TOLERANCE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2125 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0312-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2125 
ITEM: WASTE TANK N2 LINE AND COUPLINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-365 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2125A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0314-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2125 
ITEM: WASTE TANK N2 LINE AND COUPLINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C l  [ : I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2126 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0314-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2126 
ITEM: WASTE TANK N2 HYDROPHOBIC FILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F l  C F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  ' [ N l  I N 1  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 I F 1  I N 1  [ P I  C A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: THE FAILURE OF THE FILTER IS NO CRITICALITY CHANGE, 
HOWEVER IF THE LOSS OF THE BELLOWS OCCURS THEN THE FCB AND UCD 
MUST BE USED AS REDUNDANT SUPPLIES WHICH MAY REQUIRE TERMINATION 
OF THE MISSION BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT UCD SUPPLIES PAST 
3-DAYS USAGE. THE NEW CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 3/2R FNP. 
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED 
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE 
REDUNDANT PATHS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2127 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0315-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2127 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DRAIN VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
c 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
IOA/NASA EM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2128 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0315-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2128 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DRAIN VALVE (1) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: K. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 
COMPARE [ /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: INABILITY TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE IS NOTHING MORE THAN A 3/3 
CRITICALITY UNLESS AN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DEVELOPS IN THE OUTLET 
LINES AND FITTING, IN WHICH CASE THERE WOULD BE WASTE FLUIDS IN 
THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE REQUIRING USE OF FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES FOR 
A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PFP. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2129 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0315-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2129 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DRAIN VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 1 1  [ I  I 1  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLbW 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2130 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0420-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2130 
ITEM: GSE FILL QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2131 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0420-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2131 
ITEM: GSE FILL AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 I F 1  C F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE LEAKAGE DEVELOPS AFTER GROUND SERVICING AND 
THE CAP, AS SECONDARY SEAL, ALSO FAILS, THEN A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS 
OF LIFE OCCURS DUE TO CABIN PRESSURE LOSS FOR A CRITICALITY OF 
3/1R FFP. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE CONDITION OF A POTENTIAL CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE LEAK, IF A SECOND FAILURE OCCURED IN THE REDUNDANCY 
STREAM, TO BE A LIFE CRITICAL CONDITION. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2132 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2132 
ITEM: GSE FILL QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 1 1  [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: FAILURE CREATES POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF MISSION 
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE QD TO PREVENT LEAKAGE INTO 
CREW CABIN AND POTENTIAL CREW HAZARD. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-373 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2133 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2133 
ITEM: GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ / 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  1 3  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE ( 3 
REMARKS : 
GROUND SERVICING CASE ONLY. 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2134 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0432-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2134 
ITEM: GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ F l  c NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] E l  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO CLOSE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE DRAIN QD DEVELOPS AN INTERNAL LEAKAGE AFTER 
GROUND SERVICING AS WELL AS THE CAP THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
MISSION WOULD DEVELOP IF AN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IN THE LINES AND 
FITTINGS, OR AN INTERNAL LEAK IN THE DRAIN VALVE WHEREBY THE WCS 
SYSTEM MUST BE SHUT-DOWN. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY CAUSE 
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SUPPLIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2135 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0437-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2135 
ITEM: GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF BOTH SEALS ON QD AND PLUG FAIL THEN MUST RELY ON 
DRAIN VALVE TO MINIMIZE LOSS OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 1 
1 
1 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2136 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2136 
ITEM: DUMP LINES, FITTINGS, JOINTS AND UNIONS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 / 2  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE DUMP LINE PRODUCES A 
LOSS OF MISSION WITH NO CHANGE IN CRITICAL EVENTS. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT 
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2137 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2137 
ITEM: DUMP LINES, FITTINGS AND CONNECTIONS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N I I N 1  C N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW. 
IOA COMMENT: THE RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE DUMP LINE PRODUCES A LOSS 
OF MISSION WITH NO CHANGE IN CRITICAL EVENTS. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT’REDUNDANT 
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-378 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2138 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0411-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2138 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DUMP ISOLATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  E 3  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 E 3  [ I  [ I  C A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [: ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2139 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0411-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2139 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DUMP ISOLATION VALVE (1) 
1 LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
I 
I ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] E l  C I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 1 1 1  E l  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-380 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2140 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0411-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2140 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DUMP ISOLATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-381 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2141 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2141 
ITEM: QD AND TP @ HIGH CAP. FILTER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF DUMP LINE AND WCS FUNCTION REQUIRES USE OF 
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO 
LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT 
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2142 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0423-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2142 
ITEM: HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKI" 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 2 / 2  1 E l  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
NASA: WHY ARE 06-2-0423-1 AND 06-2-0438-1 NOT CONSISTENT FOR 
CRITICALITY? 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2142A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2142 
ITEM: HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
NOTE TO NASA: WHY ARE 06-2-0423-1 AND 06-2-0438-1 NOT CONSISTENT 
FOR CRITICALITY? 
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT 
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2143 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2143 
ITEM: HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA E / 1 E l  E l  E l  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 E l  E l  E l  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS OPEN, RUPTURE OF FILTER 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2144 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-043 1-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2144 
ITEM: CONTINGENCY H20 CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  E N 1  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: INABILITY TO MATE/DE-MATE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED 
FLOW 
NASA FM: FAILS CLOSED, RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF DUMP LINE AND WCS FUNCTION REQUIRES USE OF 
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO 
LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT 
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION 
~ 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2145 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-04 17-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2145 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] 1 1  I N 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: INABILITY TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENTS TO NASA: HOW CAN EXTERNAL LEAK AND INTERNAL LEAK BE 
COMBINED TO ONE ANALYSIS SHEET? 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2146 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0417-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2146 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c 3  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED/PLUGGED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DUMP VALVE AND DUMP CAPABILITY 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
CREATES A LOSS OF MISSION IF THE CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE ALSO 
FAILS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED UNTIL 
DE-ORBIT AND LANDING FOR A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP. 
THE NASA VIEWED ANY LOSS OF WATER DUMP CAPABILITY, EITHER SUPPLY 
OR WASTE WATER, AS A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE CONDITION. HOWEVER 
THE IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS LIMITATION AND VIEWED THE 
LOSS OF WASTE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY TO 
BE ONLY A LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2147 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0417-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2147 
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE 
NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT TO NASA: HOW CAN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEAKAGE BE 
CONSIDERED ON ONE ANALYSIS SHEET? 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-389 
~- ~ ~~~~ 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2148 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0419-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2148 
ITEM: DUMP NOZZLE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA ( 3 /1R 3 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  
IOA ( 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  E P I  
COMPARE ( /N 3 [ I  C N I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
E 3  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
E 3 /2R 1 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DUMP VALVE AND DUMP CAPABILITY 
CREATES A LOSS OF MISSION IF THE CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE ALSO 
FAILS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MUST BE USED UNTIL 
DE-ORBIT AND LANDING FOR A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP. 
THE NASA VIEWED ANY LOSS OF WATER DUMP CAPABILITY, EITHER SUPPLY 
OR WASTE WATER, AS A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE CONDITION. HOWEVER 
THE IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS LIMITATION AND VIEWED THE 
LOSS OF WASTE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY TO 
BE ONLY A LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-390 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2149 
06-2-0313-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2149 
TANK FLUID QUANTITY LEVEL SENSOR (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 C J  [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 C l  1 3  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: OUT OF TOLERANCE OUTPUT 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-391 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2150 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0313-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2150 
ITEM: TANK FLUID LEVEL SIGNAL CONDITIONER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: OUT OF TOLERANCE OUTPUT 
I 
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I 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-392 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2151 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2003-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2151 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA COMMENT: THE IOA CRITICALITY CHANGED BECAUSE LOSS OF THE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA/NASA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
VALVE COULD BE A MISSION IMPACT IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. 
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED 
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE 
REDUNDANT PATHS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-393 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2152 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6VC-2003-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2152 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
I I *  
[ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-394 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2153 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2021-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2153 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 3  C N I  C N I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA F'M: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
IOA COMMENT: IN THE EVENT OF A TANK RUPTURE OR OTHER FAILURE IN 
THE NITROGEN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM AND THE FAILURE OF THE INLET 
VALVE SWITCH AS AN ELECTRICAL OPEN, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
MISSION OCCURS DUE TO POSSIBILITY OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES WOULD BE USED AS REDUNDANT 
SYSTEM. 
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED 
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE 
REDUNDANT PATHS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-395 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2154 
05-6VC-2021-2 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2154 
TANK INLET VALVE SWITCH (1) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
K. BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 1 1  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED CONTACTS 
NASA FM: CLOSED - CLOSING SET OF CONTACTS 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-396 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2154A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2021-3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2154 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED CONTACTS 
NASA FM: CLOSED - OPENING SET OF CONTACTS 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-397 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2155 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2021-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2155 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE,SOLENOID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: CLOSED - OPENING SET OF CONTACTS 
IOA COMMENT: IN THE EVENT OF A TANK RUPTURE OR OTHER FAILURE IN 
THE NITROGEN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM AND THE FAILURE OF THE INLET 
VALVE SOLENOID AS AN ELECTRICAL SHORT, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
MISSION OCCURS DUE TO POSSIBILITY OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES WOULD BE USED AS REDUNDANT 
SYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-398 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2155A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2021-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2155 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE,SOLENOID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  ( 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: CLOSED - OPENING SET OF CONTACTS 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-399 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2156 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2021-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2156 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE, SOLENOID (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IN THE EVENT OF A TANK RUPTURE OR OTHER FAILURE IN 
THE NITROGEN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM AND THE FAILURE OF THE INLET 
VALVE SOLENOID AS AN ELECTRICAL OPEN, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
MISSION OCCURS DUE TO POSSIBILITY OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES WOULD BE USED AS REDUNDANT 
SYSTEM. 
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED 
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE 
REDUNDANT PATHS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-400 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2157 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2035-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ x 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2157 
ITEM: WASTE WATER TANK INLET VALVE OPEN INDICATOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  E l  I 1  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS INDICATION 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IF INDICATOR SHORTS TO GROUND THE VALVE COULD 
INADVERTENTLY CLOSE, THUS ELIMINATING ARS EFFLUENT STORAGE AND 
LIMITING MISSION LIFE, AND PRODUCING A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PPP. 
FOR THE CONDITION OF ELECTRICAL OPEN, THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
3/3. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-401 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2157A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2035-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2157 
ITEM: WASTE WATER TANK INLET VALVE OPEN INDICATOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS INDICATION 
NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: IF INDICATOR SHORTS TO GROUND THE VALVE COULD 
INADVERTENTLY CLOSE, THUS ELIMINATING ARS EFFLUENT STORAGE AND 
LIMITING MISSION LIFE, AND PRODUCING A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PPP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-402 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2158 
05-6VC-2035-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2158 
TANK INLET VALVE INICATOR DIODE (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 / 3  1 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE DIODE SHORTS TO GROUND, THEN CONTROL OF 
VALVE IS ELIMINATED, AND ARS EFFLUENT STORAGE COULD BE HALTED, 
THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE AND PRODUCING A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R 
PPP. IF THE FAILURE MODE OF ELECTRICAL OPEN IS CONSIDERED, THE 
CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/3. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-403 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2158A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2035-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2158 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE INICATOR DIODE (1) 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] C P J  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
c 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE 
NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE DIODE SHORTS TO GROUND, THEN CONTROL OF 
VALVE IS ELIMINATED, AND ARS EFFLUENT STORAGE COULD BE HALTED, 
THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE AND PRODUCING A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R 
PPP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-404 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2159 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2035-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2159 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE INICATOR RESISTOR TO MDM OF1 
(1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  c 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  1 
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
1 [ I  
1 [ I  
1 1 
[ I *  
[ I  
1 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  3 [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE RESISTOR SHORTS TO GROUND, THEN CONTROL OF 
THE VALVE IS ELIMINATED AND ARS EFFLUENT STORAGE COULD BE LOST - 
THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE AND CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PPP. IF THE 
RESISTOR IS ONLY OPEN THE CRITICALITY OF 3/3. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-405 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2159A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2035-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2159 
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE INICATOR RESISTOR TO MDM OF1 
(1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
I I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE RESISTOR SHORTS TO GROUND, THEN CONTROL OF 
THE VALVE IS ELIMINATED AND ARS EFFLUENT STORAGE COULD BE LOST - 
THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE AND CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PPP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-406 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2160 
05-6VC-2004-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2160 
TANK OUTLET VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / J 1 3  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  E 3  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  3 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, PREMATURE OPERATION, OPEN 
NASA FM: ALL CREDIBLE MODES 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
(ELECTRICAL) 
C-407 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2161 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2004-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2161 
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 I *  
~ IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 / 3  1 [ I  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, DELAYED OPERATION 
NASA FM: ALL CREDIBLE MODES 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-408 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
u 
I 
u 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2162 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2020-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2162 
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  1 3  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: ALL CREDIBLE MODES 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-409 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2163 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2020-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2163 
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
~ 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
I NASA [ 3 /3 ] I 1  [ I  E 3  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  1 3  c i  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
1 1  
[ I  
E l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
1 3 / 3  I [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: ALL CREDIBLE MODES 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-410 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2164 
05-6VC-2020-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2164 
TANK OUTLET VALVE, SOLENOID (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
r 3 / 3  1 E l  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: ALL CREDIBLE MODES 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-411 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2165 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2020-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2165 
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE, SOLENOID (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  C I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  C I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
1 3  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 1 1  c 3  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA F'M: ALL CREDIBLE MODES 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-412 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2166 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2034-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2166 
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ I  1 3  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 3 1 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
NASA FM: OPEN AND SHORT.TO GROUND 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-413 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2167 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2034-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2167 
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE DIODE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / J 1 1  [ I  C J  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND 
~ 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-414 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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1 
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1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
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I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2168 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2034-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2168 
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE RESISTOR TO MDM OF2 (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED TO GROUND 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-415 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2169 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0426-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2169 
ITEM: PRESSURE SENSOR (VARIABLE RESISTANCE BRIDGE) (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
C I  
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OUT OF TOLERANCE 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-416 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2170 BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0426-1 NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2170 
ITEM: PRESSURE SENSOR SIGNAL CONDITIONER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 
COMPARE [ / 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I "  
C l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  C l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OUT OF TOLERANCE 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-417 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2171 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2002-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2171 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
I ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
I 
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
~ REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-418 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2172 
NASA FMEA # :  05-6VC-2002-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2172 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  t l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-419 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2173 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2022-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2173 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
I LEAD ANALYST: H. BARICKMAN 
I ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SINGLE CONTACT OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
IN CLOSED POSITION 
IOA COMMENT: THE ANALYZED PART IS THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE 
SWITCH, NOT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AS TITLED. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-420 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2173A 
05-6VC-2022-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2173 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
K .  
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 
IOA [ 2 /2 ] 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY 
A B 
SCREENS 
C 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SINGLE CONTACT OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPENS), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE OPEN) 
IOA COMMENT: THE ANALYZED PART IS THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE 
SWITCH, NOT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AS TITLED. UNLESSS THE DUMP 
VALVE FAILS, THIS FAILURE IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL (3/2R PNP). 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-421 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2174 
05-6VC-2022-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2174 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
K .  BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  1 1  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
1 2 / 2  3 [ I  1 3  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SINGLE CONTACT SHORTED 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(CLOSED POSITION) 
IOA COMMENT: THE ANALYZED PART IS THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE 
SWITCH, NOT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AS TITLED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-422 
i 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2174A 
05-6VC-2022-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2174 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 
IOA [ 2 /2 3 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SINGLE CONTACT SHORTED 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPEN), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(OPEN POSITION) 
IOA COMMENT: THE ANALYZED PART IS THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ' 
SWITCH, NOT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AS TITLED. THE FAILURE OF THE 
VALVE BY ITSELF IS NOT A MISSION LOSS, THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF 
THE DUMP VALVE WOULD BE A MISSION LOSS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-423 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2175 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2022-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
2175 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  C J  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 1 I 1  1 3  C I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
L A 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(CLOSED POSITION) 
IOA COMMENT: THE ANALYZED PART IS THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE 
SWITCH, NOT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AS TITLED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-424 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2175A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2022-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2175 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N l  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPEN), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE OPEN) 
IOA COMMENT: THE ANALYZED PART IS THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE 
SWITCH, NOT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AS TITLED. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-425 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2176 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
2176 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
, COMPARE [ N /N 3 E l  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
I /NA 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THIS IS A DUPLICATE ANALYSIS - PUASE DISREGARD. 
I =PORT DATE 03/10/88 C-426 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2177 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW I 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2177 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ /NA 1 [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THIS IS A DUPLICATE ANALYSIS - PLEASE DISREGARD. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-427 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2178 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2036-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2178 
ITEM: DUMP ISOLATION VALVE INDICATOR DIODE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  E 3  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] r i  1 1  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORT, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IF INDICATOR DIODE SHORTS TO GROUND, THE VALVE 
POWER IS CUT OFF BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER IS 
"TRIPPED". CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION, BUT THERE MAY BE POTENTIAL 
WORK-AROUNDS. THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 2/2. FOR THE CASE OF AN 
ELECTRICAL OPEN ON THE DIODE, THEN A CRITICALITY OF 3/3 EXISTS. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-428 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2178A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2036-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2178 
ITEM: DUMP ISOLATION VALVE INDICATOR DIODE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORT, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE 
NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: IF INDICATOR DIODE SHORTS TO GROUND, THE VALVE 
POWER IS CUT OFF BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER IS 
"TRIPPED". CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION, BUT THERE MAY BE POTENTIAL 
WORK-AROUNDS. THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 2/2. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-429 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2179 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2036-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2179 
ITEM: DUMP ISOLATION VALVE RESISTOR TO MDM O F 2  (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 1 1  [ I  [ I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 1 3  [ I  1 3  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORT, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IF INDICATOR RESISTOR SHORTS TO GROUND, THE VALVE 
POWER IS CUT OFF BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER IS 
"TRIPPED". CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION, BUT THERE MAY BE POTENTIAL 
WORK-AROUNDS. THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 2/2. FOR THE CASE OF AN 
ELECTRICAL OPEN ON THE RESISTOR THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/3. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-430 
I 
D 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
8 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2179A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2036-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2179 
ITEM: DUMP ISOLATION VALVE RESISTOR TO MDM OF2 (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  C l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 2 / 2  1 1 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORT, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE 
NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: IF INDICATOR RESISTOR SHORTS TO GROUND, THE VALVE 
POWER IS.CUT OFF BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER IS 
"TRIPPED". CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION, BUT THERE MAY BE POTENTIAL 
WORK-AROUNDS. THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 2/2. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-431 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2180 BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2036-1 NEW [ X ] 
I SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2180 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. SWITCH INDICATOR (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 E l  1 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IF INDICATOR SHORTS TO GROUND, THE VALVE POWER IS 
CUT OFF BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER IS "TRIPPED". 
CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION EVENTHOUGH THERE ARE POTENTIAL WORK 
AROUNDS. THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 2/2. FOR THE CASE OF AN 
ELECTRICALLY OPEN SWITCH ItTELL-TALEtt THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 
3/3. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-432 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2180A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2036-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ( 3 
NEW ( X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2180 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. SWITCH INDICATOR (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA ( 2 /2 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  
IOA ( 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
r i  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  E l  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: IF INDICATOR SHORTS TO GROUND, THE VALVE POWER IS 
LOST BECAUSE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IS "TRIPPED". CAUSES LOSS OF 
MISSION, BUT THERE MAY BE POTENTIAL WORK-AROUNDS. THE 
CRITICALITY WOULD BE 2/2. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-433 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2181 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2003-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2181 
ITEM: DUMP LINE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER ( 2 )  
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  E N 3  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER REQUIRES ALTERNATE LINE 
HEATER, WHICH IF IT FAILS CREATES A LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION DUE 
TO LOSS OF DUMP CAPABILITY (CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP). 
THE NASA VIEWED ANY LOSS OF WATER DUMP CAPABILITY, EITHER SUPPLY 
OR WASTE WATER, AS A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE CONDITION. HOWEVER 
THE IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS LIMITATION AND VIEWED THE 
LOSS OF WASTE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY TO 
BE ONLY A LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-434 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2182 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2003-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2182 
ITEM: DUMP LINE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
NOTE: SEE NASA SUPPLY H20 DUMP LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-435 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2183 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-0422-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2183 
ITEM: DUMP LINE HEATER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ N l  1 3  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-436 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2184 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [: 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2184 
ITEM: DUMP LINE HEATER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA I / 1 [ I  C I  C I  I I "  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ : I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  I N 1  C N I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-437 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2185 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2185 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP HEATER LINE THERMOSTAT (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 ' [ I  C l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN, SHORTED 
IOA COMMENT: FOR THE CASE OF SHORTED TO GROUND IF THE REDUNDANT 
HEATER FAIL TO FUNCTION THEN A MISSION LOSS COULD BE PRODUCED 
(CRITICALITY 3/2R PPP). 
I THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-438 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2186 
06-2-0422-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 
NEW [ 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2186 
WASTE H20 DUMP HEATER LINE THERMOSTAT 
K. BARICKMAN 
1 
X I  
(4) 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  I N 3  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
c-439 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2187 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0430-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2187 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP LINE TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (1) 
(POTENTIAL COMPARATOR) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF THE TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER ELIMINATES SAFE 
WASTE WATER DUMP AND REQUIRES USE OF FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES WHICH 
MAY BE INSUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE MISSION,CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP. 
OUT OF TOLERANCE/LOSS OF OUTPUT 
THE POTENTIAL FOR WASTE WATER DUMP LINE FREEZING WITHOUT THE 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR INDICATOR CREATED AN IOA CRITICALITY OF 3/2R, 
INSTEAD OF THE NASA CRITICALITY OF 3/3. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-440 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
CONDITIONER 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2188 
06-2-0430-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2188 
WASTE H20 DUMP LINE TEMPERATURE SIGNAL 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  1 I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF THE TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER ELIMINATES SAFE 
WASTE.WATER DUMP AND REQUIRES USE OF FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES WHICH 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
MAY BE INSUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE MISSION, CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP. 
THE POTENTIAL FOR WASTE WATER DUMP LINE FREEZING WITHOUT THE 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR INDICATOR CREATED AN IOA CRITICALITY OF 3/2R, 
INSTEAD OF THE NASA CRITICALITY OF 3/3. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-441 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2189 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2001-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2189 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE/NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE WASTE WATER DUMP REQUIRES USE OF 
THE CWC FOR FLUID STORAGE THUS 3/2R CRITICALITY, NOT LOSS OF 
LIFE 
THE NASA VIEWED ANY LOSS OF WATER DUMP CAPABILITY, EITHER SUPPLY 
OR WASTE WATER, AS A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE CONDITION. HOWEVER 
THE IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS LIMITATION AND VIEWED THE 
LOSS OF WASTE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY TO 
BE ONLY A LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-442 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2190 
05-6VC-2001-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2190 
DUMP VALVE/NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
K .  
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 
COMPARE / ] 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
[ I  1 E 1 
I I *  
E l  
1 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  E l  E l  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-443 
! ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA F'MEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2191 
05-6VC-2024-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2191 
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1) 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
[ I  C 3  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
1 1  
E N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
e 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
e 3 /1R 1 C P l  c NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP 
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE 
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A 
VALVE OPEN PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF THE 
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/1R PNP. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION 
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE 
MRJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED 
THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE 
THREATENING CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-444 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2191A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2024-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2191 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
NASA FM: FAILS CLOSED, SHORTS POLE TO POLE 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP 
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE 
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A 
VALVE CLOSED PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF 
THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R 
PNP. THE INSTRUMENTATION READINESS FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP 
SUBSYSTEM WAS CONSIDERED A FUNCTIONAL MISSION CRITICAL IF 
NASA FMEA CONSIDERED THEM TO BE A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL 
CONDITION. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
ADDITIONAL FAILURES OCCURRED UNDER THE IOA ANALYSYS; WHEREAS, THE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-445 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2192 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2024-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2192 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 E l  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP 
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE 
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A 
VALVE OPEN PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF THE 
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/1R PNP. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION 
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE 
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED 
THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE 
THREATENING CONDITION. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-446 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2193 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2024-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2193 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ P I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  E l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND WHILE VALVE CLOSED. 
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP 
CAPABILITY THRU NORMAL CHANNELS. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A 
VALVE CLOSED PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF 
THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS-THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/1R 
PNP . 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION 
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE 
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST 
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING 
CONDITION. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-447 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2194 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2042-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2194 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER INDICATOR (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  E l  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  / P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  I N 1  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: WITH THE LOSS OF THE HEATER INDICATOR, THERE IS NO 
MISSION LOSS. HOWEVER IF ALL HEATER INDICATORS FAILS THEN THERE 
IS A LOSS OF DUMP CAPABILITY AND THUS LOSS OF MISSION-CRITICALITY 
3/2R PPP. 
THE INSTRUMENTATION READINESS FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP SUBSYSTEM 
WAS CONSIDERED A FUNCTIONAL MISSION CRITICAL IF ADDITIONAL 
FAILURES OCCURRED UNDER THE IOA ANALYSYS; WHEREAS, THE NASA F'MEA 
CONSIDERED THEM TO BE A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-448 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2195 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2023-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2195 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 1 1  [ N l  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPEN), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE OPEN) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-449 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2195A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2023-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2195 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE CLOSED) 
IOA COMMENT; FOR GENERAL OPEN ELECTRICAL FAILURE THE CRITICALY 
I WOULD BE 3/1R PNP, HOWEVER FOR THE SPECIFIC CASE OF SWITCH FAILS 
OPEN DURING THE DUMP PROCESS THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 2/1R PNP 
BECAUSE OF LOST DUMP CAPABILITY AND WITH SUBSEQUENT DUMP 
ISOLATION VALVE FAILURE OF INTERNAL LEAKAGE OR EXTERNAL LEAK IN 
THE CROSS-TIE QD A LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO CABIN ATMOSPHERE LOSS IS A 
POTENTIAL HAZARD. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-450 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2196 
05-6VC-2023-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2196 
WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (1) 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 
COMPARE [ / 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: SWITCH 
(VALVE OPEN) 
FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPEN), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-451 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2196A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2023-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2196 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE CLOSED) 
IOA COMMENT: FOR THE SPECIFIC CASE OF SHORTED VALVE IF THE VALVE 
IS CLOSED, THE RESULTING CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/1R PNP. HOWEVER 
FOR THE GENERAL CASE FOR SHORTED TO GROUND THE VALVE OPEN WOULD 
BE A CRITICALITY OF 2/1R PNP BECAUSE OF LOST DUMP CAPABILITY AND 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF ATMOSPHERE IF A SUBSEQUENT REDUNDANT VALVE OR 
CROSS-TIE QD FAILS TO SEAL. 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-452 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2197 
05-6VC-2023-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2197 
WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  E N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPEN), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE OPEN) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-453 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2197A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2023-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2197 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / I [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE CLOSED) 
IOA COMMENT: THE CASE IN WHICH THE SWITCH IS JAMMED OPEN, THEN A 
MISSION LOSS IS DEVELOPED IF THE VALVE IS OPEN AT THE TIME OF 
OF VALVE CLOSED, THE SWITCH FAILURE WOULD ONLY BE 3/1R PNP. 
I FAILURE, FOR A CRITICALITY 2/1R PNP. HOWEVER, FOR THE CONDITION 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-454 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2198 
05-6VC-2023-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2198 
WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SOLENOID (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] 'I [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPEN), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE OPEN) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-455 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2198A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2023-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2198 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SOLENOID (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE CLOSED) 
IOA COMMENT: THE WORST CASE WOULD BE AN ELECTRICAL OPEN ON THE 
SOLENOID DURING A VALVE OPEN CONDITION BECAUSE OF LOSS OF MISSION 
DUE TO LOST DUMP CAPABILITY AND A LOSS OF LIFE IF ONE OF THE 
REDUNDANT VALVES FAILS OPEN (CRITICALITY 2/1R PNP). THE CASE 
OF VALVE CLOSED DOES PRODUCE A 3/1R PNP CRITICALITY BECAUSE THERE 
ARE OTHER METHODS OF DOING WASTE WATER DUMPS. 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-456 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2199 
05-6VC-2023-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2199 
WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SOLENOID (1) 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 
COMPARE [ / 3 
BARIC- 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPEN), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE OPEN) 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-457 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2199A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2023-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2199 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SOLENOID (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 1 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE CLOSED) 
IOA COMMENT: THE WORST CASE EVENT WOULD BE A SHORTED SOLENOID 
DURING THE VALVE OPEN PHASE, WHICH PRODUCES A LOSS OF DUMP 
CAPABILITY. THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE IF ONE OF THE 
UPSTREAM VALVES OR LINES FAIL AND ALLOWS LOSS OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE 
PRODUCES A CRITICALITY 2/1R PNP. THE CASE OF A CLOSED VALVE THAT 
SHORTS CREATES A 3/1R PNP CONDITION BECAUSE THERE ARE ALTERNATE 
DUMP METHODS AVAILABLE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-458 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2200 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2200 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SOLENOID (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
c /NA 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA COMMENT: DELETE THIS ANALYSIS, THE FAILURE/HARDWARE DO NOT 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [: 3 
EXIST. 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-459 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-2201 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2023-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2201 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE INDICATOR RESISTOR TO MDM OF3 (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ N /N 1 C N I  C N I  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
1 1  
I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
2 /1R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E A 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT [OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE 
RESISTANCE] 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE OPEN), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE OPEN) 
IOA COMMENT: IF RESISTOR SHORTS TO GROUND COULD PRODUCE LOSS OF 
VALVE ACTUATION BECAUSE OF NO POWER AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE 
CONDITION IF SECOND FAILURE OCCURS (CRITICALITY 2/1R PPP). THE 
NASA CONDITION OF VALVE OPEN DURING RESISTOR FAILURE WOULD BE 
A 2/1R PPP BECAUSE OF THE LOST DUMP CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL FOR 
LOSS OF LIFE IF REDUNDANT UPSTREAM ATMOSPHERE SEALS FAIL. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-460 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2201A 
05-6VC-2023-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2201 
DUMP VALVE INDICATOR RESISTOR TO MDM OF3 (1) 
K. 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 
COMPARE [ /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY 
A B 
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT (ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORTED, EXCESSIVE 
RESISTANCE) 
NASA FM: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (VALVE CLOSED), SWITCH FAILS CLOSED 
(VALVE CLOSED) 
IOA COMMENT: IF RESISTOR SHORTS TO GROUND COULD PRODUCE LOSS OF 
VALVE ACTUATION BECAUSE OF NO POWER AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE 
CONDITION IF SECOND FAILURE OCCURS. FOR THE NASA CONDITION OF 
VALVE CLOSED DURING FAILURE THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/1R 
PPP BECAUSE THERE ARE ALTERNATE DUMP METHODS AVAILABLE IN THE 
EVENT OF LOSS OF THE VALVE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-461 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2202 
NASA FMEA # :  05-6VC-2031-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2202 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE INDICATOR DIODE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT (OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE 
NASA FM: FAILS OPEN 
RESISTANCE) 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-462 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2202A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2031-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2202 
ITEM: DUMP VALVE INDICATOR DIODE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ : I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT (ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORTED, EXCESSIVE 
RESISTANCE ) 
NASA FM: SHORTED 
IOA COMMENT: IF DIODE SHORTS TO GROUND COULD PRODUCE LOSS OF 
VALVE ACTUATION BECAUSE OF NO POWER AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION 
CONDITION IF SECOND FAILURE OCCURS FOR A CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP 
BECAUSE OF THE LOST DUMP CAPABILITY. 
THE POTENTIAL FOR WASTE WATER DUMP LINE FREEZING WITHOUT THE 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR INDICATOR CREATED AN IOA CRITICALITY OF 3/2R, 
INSTEAD OF THE NASA CRITICALITY OF 3/3. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-463 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2203 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0421-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2203 
ITEM: DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE ' [ / 3 [ I  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED 
NASA FM: OPEN 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-464 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2204 
06-2-0429-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2204 
WASTE H20 DUMP NOZZLE TEMP. TRANSDUCER (2) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] 1 1  C N I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED 
NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-465 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1 UBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2205 
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP NOZZLE SIGNAL CONDITIONER (2) 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-2205 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0429-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  1 P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
1 1  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA F'M: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED 
NASA F'M: LOSS OF OUTPUT 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-466 
I 
1 
I 
I 
i 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1[ 
I 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
STATUS) (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
IS-2206 
06-2-0421-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2206 
DUMP NOZZLE RESISTOR TO MDM OF4 (HEATER 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI C P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED TO GROUND 
NASA FM: OPEN 
IOA COMMENT: IF RESISTOR SHORTS TO GROUND, LOSS OF POWER TO 
HEATERS IS PRODUCED. REDUNDANT HEATER MUST BE USED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-467 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2207 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0404-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2207 
ITEM: CREW MODULE INTER 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
TAL LINE AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  E l  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE DOES NOT CLOSE 
THEN HAVE CATASTROPHIC LOSS OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE AND LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/1R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-468 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2208 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2208 
ITEM: INTERNAL LINE AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I /NA 1 C l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
DELETE THIS ANALYSIS-THE HARDWARE DOES NOT EXIST ANYMORE. 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-469 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2209 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0402-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2209 
ITEM: EXTERNAL LINE AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 E l  E 3  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 E N 1  [ N l  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO GASEOUS HYDROGEN 
IN THE CARGO BAY AND POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF VEHICLE IF A SPARK 
SOURCE IS PREVENT, CRITICALITY 2/1R PPP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-470 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
Ls-2210 
06-2-0404-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2210 
DYNATUBE FITTING AT CREW CABIN WALL (1) 
K .  
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 1 /1 3 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 /1R 1 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: IF AN INTERNAL LEAK DEVELOPS IN THE MANUAL VACUUM 
VENT VALVE AS WELL AS THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IN THE DYNATUBE 
FITTING LINE WOULD PRODUCE AN UNRESTRICTED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS 
WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND A CRITICALITY 3/1R PNP. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-471 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2211 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0418-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2211 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT NOZZLE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] 1 1  1 3  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 1 [ N l  I N 1  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCXED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THIS MAY BE DETERMINED TO BE A "NON-CREDIBLE" 
CONDITION OF BLOCKED FLOW IN THE VACUUM VENT LINE, HOWEVER IF 
PLAUSIBLE A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ENVIRONMENT DUE TO HYDROGEN GAS 
CONCENTRATIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, HENCE THE 1/1 CRITICALITY. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY 
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF 
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-472 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
Ls-2212 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2212 
VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (2) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /3 
* CIL RETENTION 
REMARKS : 
1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
IOA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-473 
APPENDIX C 
3SESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2213 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2213 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N J C N J  C N I  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
, 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 ~ c-474 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2214 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0424-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2214 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 C I  C I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
C N I  E N 1  [ N l  1 N l  COMPARE [ N /N 3 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /1R 1 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ A I  (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED 
NASA FM: OPEN 
NOTE: THE NASA CRITICALITY WAS 3/1R IN EARLIER ANALYSES 
IOA COMMENT: WHY HAVE HEATERS IF IT DOES NOT POSSIBLE TO FREEZE 
LINE UP? 
IS A POTENTIAL WORST CASE. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY 
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF 
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IF LINE FREEZE UP IS POSSIBLE THEN 3/1R PNP CRITICALITY 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-475 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2215 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0428-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2215 
ITEM: LINE TEMPERATURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J C I  e 3  e 3  e I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 I 3  e 1  1 3  e 3  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  1 1  I 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
e 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
e 3 / 3  1 [ I  1 1  C l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORTED 
NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-476 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
LS-2216 
06-2-0428-1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2216 
LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR (1) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] E l  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORTED 
NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [: 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-477 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2217 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2006-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2217 
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  J [ I  C J  [ I  [ : I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 / 3  3 E 3  [ I  1 3  E 3  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO OPEN 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-478 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2218 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2006-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2218 
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED, 
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACWM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE 
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS 
ENVIRONMENT. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY 
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF 
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-479 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2219 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2219 
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ELECTRICAL OPEN 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-480 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2220 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2025-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2220 
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 1 1  1 1  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 E l  [ I  [ I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 / 1  1 I 1  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED, 
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE 
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS 
ENVIRONMENT. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY 
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF 
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-481 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-222OA 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2025-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2220 
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: SHORTED 
NASA FM: CLOSED, SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED, 
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE 
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS 
ENVIROMENT. 
I 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY 
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF 
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
Ls-2221 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2221 
RESISTOR TO MDM OF4 (HEATER INDICATOR)(l) 
K. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
COMPARE [ N /N J 
BARIC- 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT (ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORT) 
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-483 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2222 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0425-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2222 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT NOZZLE HEATER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORT 
NASA FM: OPEN 
NOTE: THE NASA CRITICALITY WERE 2R/3 DURING A PREVIOUS ANALYSIS. 
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED, 
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE 
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS 
ENVIRONMENT. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY 
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF 
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-484 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/2 2/87 
LS-2223 
06-2-0427-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2223 
NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  1 1  [ I  C I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  e 1  e 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELF,TE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
ADEQUATE ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
C-4 8 5 REPORT DATE 03/10/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2224 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-2-0427-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2224 
ITEM: NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR CONDITIONER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) * 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: LOSS OF OUTPUT, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
1 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-486 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2225X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0102-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2225 
ITEM: FIXED FILTER URINAL SCREEN (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-487 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2226X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0444-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2226 
ITEM: E m  QD (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ / 3 1 3  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (Jf different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-488 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2227X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0203-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2227 
ITEM: COMMODE LINER 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
NASA FM: PLUGGED, OVERFILLED 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-489 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2228X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0206-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2228 
ITEM: COMMODE LINER 
I LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
I ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
COMPARE 1 / 1 1 1  1 1  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
C I  
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-490 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2229X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0220-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE 3 
NEW X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2229 
ITEM: AUXILIARY TRASH VENT ORIFICE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA 3 /3 ] E l  E l  E l  c I *  
IOA 3 /3 3 E l  E l  E l  E l  
COMPARE / 3 E l  E l  E l  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E 3 / 3  1 E l  E l  E l  E l  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW., LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE 3 
INADEQUATE 3 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-491 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-223OX 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0217-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2230 
ITEM: WET TRASH VENT LINE ORIFICE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  r 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  c 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
C I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I REMARKS : IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-492 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2231X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0217-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2231 
ITEM: WET TRASH VENT LINE ORIFICE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ /NA 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
c /NA 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: VIEWED AS NON-CREDIBLE, SEE IOA ANALYSES 2048 AND 
2051 FOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF VALVE HOUSING. 
THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE VACUUM VENT ORIFICE WAS VIEWED TO BE 
"NON-CREDIBLE" IN THE IOA ANALYSIS BECAUSE OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE ORIFICE AND THE SUPPORT HOUSING. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-493 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2232X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2232 
ITEM: WCS CHECK VALVE LINES TO WWS QD 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  I 1  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-494 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2233X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2233 
ITEM: WCS CHECK VALVE LINES TO WWS QD 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY 
NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE 
ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE 
NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-495 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2234X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0210-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2234 
ITEM: COMMODE RE-PRESSURIZATION VALVE ORIFICE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCIUIENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
ADD/DELETE 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA EM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
I 
I ADEQUATE [ 3 INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-496 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2235X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0442-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2235 
ITEM: HOSE ASSEMBLY, FAN/SEPARATOR TO CV (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-497 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2236X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0445-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2236 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MUFFLER HOUSING INLET DUCT 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
I 
NASA [ 2 /2  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: NOT VIEWED AS IMMEDIATE MISSION CRITICAL BECAUSE OF 
FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLY USAGE MAY CREATE A 
LOSS OF MISSION DEPENDING ON MISSION DURATION DUE TO LACK OF 
SUPPLIES. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION 
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE 
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST 
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING 
CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-498 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2237X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0445-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2237 
ITEM: MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEMBLY (1) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: NOT VIEWED AS IMMEDIATE MISSION CRITICAL BECAUSE OF 
FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLY USAGE MAY CREATE A 
LOSS OF MISSION DEPENDING ON MISSION DURATION DUE TO LACK OF 
SUPPLIES. 
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION 
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE 
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST 
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING 
CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-499 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2238X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0445-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2238 
ITEM: MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEMBLY (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 / 2  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  3 [ I  1 1  C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-500 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
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